LSJ AND THE PROBLEM OF POETIC ARCHAISM: FROM MEANINGS TO ICONYMS[1]

I

'It is supposed', declared the poet Wordsworth in 1802, 'that by the act of writing in verse an author makes a formal engagement that he will gratify certain known habits of association; that he not only thus apprizes the reader that certain classes of ideas and expressions will be found in his book, but that others will be carefully excluded. This exponent or symbol held forth by metrical language must in different eras of literature have excited very different expectations.' For his own era of literature Wordsworth proposed a language derived from the 'simple and unelaborated expressions' of the 'language really spoken by men', at the expense of 'devices to elevate the style' and 'what is usually called poetic diction'.[2]

In the era of early and classical Greece, very little poetry was written according to Wordsworth's prescription. With a few exceptions, like the spoken portions of comedy and the earlier tradition of low lyric that goes back to Archilochus,[3] most Greek verse – good, bad, or indifferent – is composed in a language more or less elevated: that is, more or less removed from the 'language really spoken by men'. Among other things, it is more or less removed from the language really spoken by the men *of its own time.*

Aristotle, writing in an era very different from Wordsworth's, prescribed elevation as one of the two essential characteristics of poetic idiom, and among the various means to that end listed the γλῶττα: that is, a word not in current usage.[4] Though Aristotle himself, in his use of that term, is primarily concerned with words borrowed from another dialect,[5] the non-currency that most ancient literary scholars associated with the γλῶττα was the kind involving obsolete literary expressions. 'The γλῶττα', says Galen, 'is an old word that has fallen out of ordinary usage.'[6] It was this kind of γλῶττα of which ancient scholars compiled systematic lists, from the third century B.C. onwards,[7] and this kind of γλῶττα which Greek poets, especially at their most elevated, liked to use. 'All mortal things', says Horace, 'must perish, including words, but many words that have fallen out of use are born again.'[8] The length of the Greek poetic tradition and the Greeks' respect for tradition (all things κατὰ τὰ πάτρια) ensured a constant supply of obsolete words and a willingness to perpetuate them.

[2] Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, edd. R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones (revised edition, 1965), pp. 243, 245, 254, 250, 251.

[3] cf. M. S. Silk, 'Aristophanes as a lyric poet', *YClS* 26 (1980), 123–5.

[4] *Po.* 1458 a 18–22: the other characteristic was clarity. It is arguable that archaism must always be the most characteristic source of poetic diction: cf. Owen Barfield, *Poetic Diction*[3] (1973), 152.

[5] So, rightly, J. Whatmough, *Poetic, Scientific and other Forms of Discourse* (1956), 105 f.; the point is usually obscured by commentators (see e.g. Bywater's long discussion at 1457b4).

[6] *Lex. Hippocr.* 19. 66 Kühn ἡ γλῶττα παλαιόν ἐστιν ὄνομα τῆς συνηθείας ἐκπεπτωκός: γλῶττα in this sense occurs as early as Aristophanes (*fr.* 222).

[7] And conceivably before: see R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (1968), 78 f., 90–2.

[8] *Ars Poetica* 68 ff.

However, the perpetuation (or rebirth) of an obsolete word creates a special linguistic situation. Living words, words in current use, have what we ordinarily call meanings. With obsolete words that familiar property cannot be guaranteed.

II

$$\nu\upsilon\kappa\tau\grave{o}s\ a\grave{\iota}a\nu\grave{\eta}s\ \kappa\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\lambda os$$

Sophocles, *Ajax* 672.

Stanford ad loc.:

$a\grave{\iota}a\nu\acute{\eta}s$: the epithet has been variously explained. Kamerbeek follows a suggestion by $\varSigma$ and translates 'dark, ominous'...Jebb prefers 'weary' and LS 'eternal', accepting the derivation from $a\grave{\iota}e\acute{\iota}$. The *Souda* mentions another derivation from $a\grave{\iota}\acute{a}\zeta\omega$..., which implies a meaning 'mournful, sorrowful'. The last seems inept here. ...undoubtedly some of the uses of $a\grave{\iota}a\nu\acute{\eta}s$ elsewhere imply 'long-lasting'... The lexicography of this word needs further examination.

The requisite discussion of words of this kind must certainly include lexicography, but not, I think, quite on the lines that Stanford seems to have in mind. The word $a\grave{\iota}a\nu\acute{\eta}s$ recurs in Sophocles at *Electra* 506, where the chorus says of Pelops' chariot race:

$$\dot{\omega}s\ \check{\epsilon}\mu o\lambda\epsilon s\ a\grave{\iota}a\nu\grave{\eta}s\ \tau\hat{a}\delta\epsilon\ \gamma\hat{a}.$$

Jebb comments: '$a\grave{\iota}a\nu\acute{\eta}s$ suits the idea of persistent calamity. Whatever its real etymology, it was associated with $\grave{a}\epsilon\acute{\iota}$..., and was used to denote that which pains by wearying, or wearing...'. I have no great quarrel with this, except that 'denote' is the wrong word.

Stanford and Jebb are concerned to ask: 'what does $a\grave{\iota}a\nu\acute{\eta}s$ mean in these passages?' For the moment let us evade that question and pose a different one: 'what is the *effect* of $a\grave{\iota}a\nu\acute{\eta}s$ in these passages?' This question I would answer, very provisionally, by means of an English parallel: a parallel, that is, to the effect, as I read it; the nature of the two literary contexts and the means whereby the effects are produced are quite different.

James Joyce, *Finnegan's Wake*,[9] a washerwoman talking on the banks of the Liffey:

> Didn't you hear it a deluge of times, ufer and ufer,
> respund to spond? You deed, you deed!

I offer a few observations on this passage:

(i) To avoid any irrelevant lines of enquiry, the reader should note that the 'it' is not exactly identified by the context, but that the context invites thoughts of something big: Life, or Sex, or Death.

(ii) Joyce is using the technique of portmanteau word-formation which is the staple of his writing in this book. Its most characteristic effects include ambiguity in the Empsonian sense (plurality of meaning).

(iii) Rivers are omnipresent in this passage. The washerwoman is on the banks of one. She hears her 'it' a 'deluge' of times, and in fact 'ufer and ufer'. This is one of Joyce's portmanteau coinages, which (in the first instance) obviously means 'over and over' and also (via German) suggests 'shore to shore'.

(iv) 'Spond' is obscure and feels it. With rivers in mind, we might think of *pond* and, rivers aside, *spawned* (which fits in with sex) and then (by virtue of the phonetic similarity) *spondee* – and commentators on the passage actually make speculative comments about the spondaic rhythm of *spars spin*ning down the Liffey (re-*spun*-d), and only just pull up short of interpreting 'respund' in terms of a metrical respunsion.

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[9] Near the end of Part I (p. 214 in the standard editions).

(v) However, for all this learning, 'spond' remains obscure. Joyce may or may not have known what *he* meant by it, but *it* remains obscure. It is not like 'ufer and ufer', which impinges as a special version of something else. 'Ufer and ufer', we might say, is a heightened equivalent of 'over and over': it *means* it, while also suggesting something else. 'Spond', in contrast, cannot be said to be a heightened equivalent of anything in particular. It carries various evocations, but, in the ordinary sense, no meaning. It has what one critic (with reference to a different passage in *Finnegan's Wake*) has called 'an empty ambiguity'.[10] αἰανής in Sophocles involves no word-coinage, but works (or not) along the same lines.

<center>III</center>

For poets, archaisms offer certain opportunities. For subsequent interpreters, not least those representative and influential interpreters, the lexicographers, they pose a delicate problem. To do justice to literary language, any interpreter must first understand its various modes. 'Literary lexicography', however, is a discipline which has not yet attracted much attention, in the study of dead languages or elsewhere; and the standard lexicon of ancient Greek, the ninth edition of LSJ, though admirable in many respects, is seriously inattentive in this one.[11] The particular mode represented by Sophocles' αἰανής has in any case been neglected even by sophisticated modern littérateurs, presumably because of a dearth of modern specimens (Wordsworthian principles having, on the whole, prevailed in the poetry of the modern West).[12]

In Greek scholarship there have, indeed, been some valuable studies of specific Greek words, like Leumann's work on archaisms in Homer and Harvey's on the re-uses of Homeric vocabulary in the lyric corpus.[13] There are also helpful, but isolated, remarks like those of Hermann Fränkel on archaic epic words which 'become mere sound'.[14] Much of Leumann's attention (too much, according to Fränkel)[15] was devoted to the principle of 'productive misunderstanding', as exemplified by the epic word κύμβαχος.[16] This word occurs twice in pre-Hellenistic literature, both times in the *Iliad*. The occurrences are set out in LSJ:

> **κύμβᾰχος, ον,** (κύμβη Β) *head-foremost, tumbling,* ἔκπεσε δίφρου κύμβαχος ἐν κονίῃσιν Il. 5. 586; κ. ἐπ' ὤμους Hld. 10. 30, cf. Lyc. 66, Eust. 584. 16.   **II.** Subst., ὁ, *crown of a helmet,* κόρυθος . . ἱπποδασείης κ. ἀκρότατος Il. 15. 536.

On its first appearance the word is used as an adjective and as if it meant 'headfirst'; on its second as a noun and as if it meant 'helmet' or 'top of a helmet'. One of these uses is derived from the other by misunderstanding, suggests Leumann – presumably the nominal from the adjectival, though Leumann himself is not sure. At all events, we have here a misunderstanding so radical as to involve grammatical status as well as semantic content in the ordinary sense. That such a misunderstanding is possible is because there is no-one around to correct it. Fränkel pertinently remarks that

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[10] G. D. Martin, *Language, Truth and Poetry* (1975), 196.

[11] cf. M. S. Silk, *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* (1974), xii f. and 261 ('LSJ: deficiencies'), and n. 86 below.

[12] cf. below, pp. 327 f.

[13] M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter* (1950); A. E. Harvey, 'Homeric Epithets in Greek Lyric Poetry', *CQ* n.s. 7 (1957), 206 ff.

[14] *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (1962), 30; cf. *Antidoron* (Festschrift J. Wackernagel, 1923), 274 ff.

[15] *Dichtung und Philosophie*, 30, n. 5.

[16] *Homerische Wörter*, 231–3.

ordinary words are learned in childhood from speakers who already know their correct (i.e. ordinary) uses, whereas literary archaisms are learned only from earlier literature.[17] One thinks, then, of the anonymous child who figures in all the linguistic handbooks as the inventor of the adjective 'haive' (adult, 'behave' – child, 'I *am* being haive'). The poet who misinterpreted the adjective κύμβαχος as a noun is like a child who interprets 'behave' as two words, but is never told his mistake.

IV

The object of this article is to provide some guidelines for a systematic treatment of whatever it is that Sophocles' αἰανής (though perhaps not Homer's κύμβαχος) exemplifies. The deficiencies I find in available treatments are found representatively in LSJ, and are summed up not so much by the lexicon's treatment of this much-discussed word as by its attempt to cope with a less familar γλῶττα, the word πέμφιξ. This word, with its variant form πεμφίς and the derivative πεμφιγώδης, is treated by LSJ at some length:

πεμφῑγώδης, ες, (πέμφιξ) accompanied by vesicular eruption, Hp. Epid. 6. 1. 14, cf. Gal. ad loc. (17(1). 878), Id. 19. 399; πεμφιδ-, Hsch.
πέμφιξ, ῑγος, ἡ, breath, blast, ἀπῆξε πέμφιξ Ἰονίου πέλας πόρου prob. in S. Fr. 337; κεραυνία π. βροντῆς Id. Fr. 538; δυσχείμερος π. A. Fr. 195. 4. 2. ray, τηλέσκοπον πέμφιγα χρυσέαν ἰδών S. Fr. 338; ἃς οὔτε π. ἡλίου προσδέρκεται οὔτε κτλ. A. Fr. 170. 3. drop, Id. Fr. 205; μηδ' αἵματος πέμφιγα πρὸς πέδῳ βάλῃς Id. Fr. 183. 4. cloud, πέμφιγι...ἀγγέλῳ πυρός cloud, harbinger of lightning, S. Fr. 539; driving rain or rain-cloud, Ibyc. 17; πελιδναὶ φλύκταιναι πέμφιξιν ἐειδόμεναι ὑετοῖο, ... ἀμυδρήεσσαι ἐς ὠπήν livid pustules like rain clouds(in colour)...dim to the sight, Nic. Th. 273 (but = bubbles acc. to Sch.); dub. sens. in Call. Fr. 483 (prob. = Oxy. 2080. 43). 5. ghost, Lyc. 1106, and so prob. in Euph. 134. 6. pustule or part surrounding a pustule, ἐφίσταται π. οἷον ἐλαίου χλωρῆς ὥσπερ ἀράχνιον Euryphon ap. Gal. 17(1). 886.
πεμφίς, ίδος or ῐδος, ἡ, = foreg. 5, Lyc. 686 (v. 1. πεμφίγων).

In particular, πέμφιξ is set out under six separate headings with copious citations from verse and one from prose (Euryphon ap. Gal., sense 6). There is, incidentally, a further short article on πέμφιξ in the Supplement, the chief import of which is to transfer the Nicander passage from 4, 'cloud', to 3, 'drop'; and there are also textual complications and uncertainties associated with several of the citations, which, however, hardly affect the point at issue.[18]

A convenient supplement to LSJ's main article is provided by Pearson on Sophocles, fr. 337 (the first of LSJ's citations): 'Practically all our knowledge of the word πέμφιξ is derived from Galen's discussion which is the source of the present fragment. He also quotes frs. 338, 538 and 539, as well as fragments from Aeschylus, Ibycus, Callimachus and Euphorion...', and (as Pearson omits to mention) the fragment of Euryphon (medical writer, early fourth century). Pearson also neglects to tell us that 'Galen's discussion' is in fact the lengthy commentary on the word πεμφιγώδης in the sixth book of the Hippocratic Epidemics (mid-fourth century?) which is referred to by LSJ s.v. He resumes: 'Outside Galen's notice πέμφιξ occurs only once in Nicander and twice in Lycophron...', that is, once as πέμφιξ, once (it seems) as πεμφίς. Pearson again:

[17] Antidoron (Festschrift Wackernagel), 274 f.
[18] The most notable complications arise from the existence of an Arabic version of Galen's commentary on Hp. Epid. 6 alongside an often defective Western manuscript tradition (see Wenkebach's preface to CMG V 10. 2. 2, pp. x ff.).

The central notion of πέμφιξ is *air driven or expelled, a puff of wind*, hence Galen finds the meaning πνοή in the present passage, in fr. 538, and in Aesch. fr. 195... It is thus opposed to... a bubble: Nic. *Ther.* 272... Galen notes its employment to express 'drops of rain'..., quoting Callimachus..., and similarly drops of any liquid..., quoting Aeschylus.... In Ibycus... *driving rain* or *mist* is undoubtedly meant. The extract, however, follows fr. 539, and is included by Galen under the signification *cloud*.... At this point we must notice the remarkable transition of meaning by which πέμφιξ comes to signify a *ray of light*.... It should be added that Lycophron... employs πέμφιξ in the sense of a *ghost*.

The rest of Pearson's article includes an attempt to reconcile the senses listed with reference to 'the *fiery waterspout* as described by Lucretius', the 'pronouncements of contemporary meteorology', and 'popular belief and philosophical speculation on the nature of the ψυχή'. On the whole, however, his discussion is aligned with that in LSJ and both, in turn, with Galen.

I am not concerned with all the detail of the interpretations offered by Pearson and LSJ, but with the method – and the phenomenon – of their interpretations. As Pearson says (and as LSJ might have said too), most of our knowledge of πέμφιξ comes from one note by Galen, on which I observe the following:

(i) πυρετοί... πεμφιγώδεες, ἰδεῖν δεινοί (*Epid.* 6. 1. 14) is the Hippocratic *locus* that Galen is commenting on, and the burden of his comments is that the meaning of πεμφιγώδεες is disputed, though in the light of his evidence we can hardly doubt that the πέμφιξ fevers with their unsightly symptoms (ἰδεῖν δεινοί) are fevers accompanied by a certain kind of swelling, namely φλύκταιναί, which are blisters or pustules.[19] That is, LSJ is right to allude to 'vesicular eruption' here (except that the phrase means 'blisters', and on Galen's evidence they could have said 'pustules' instead); this Hippocratic passage is to be closely related to the Euryphon passage cited by LSJ under πέμφιξ 6, 'pustule or part surrounding a pustule'; and, in short, the two classical prose usages of πέμφιξ/πεμφιγώδης agree in using the word with reference to spots or swellings on the skin.

(ii) It is implicit in Galen's discussion that πέμφιξ was a problem-word for the ancients in its various poetic contexts. Where LSJ assigns meanings to the word, and Pearson speaks of its 'central notion', Galen repeatedly uses expressions like δοκεῖ χρῆσθαι ἐπί..., 'so-and-so *apparently* uses the word with reference to...'.

(iii) Counting the Hippocratic πεμφιγώδης and Lycophron's πεμφίς (but not counting the citations of the word by Galen himself), there are in all sixteen known occurrences of the word in Greek literature – every one of which is in LSJ. Of these sixteen, Galen refers to thirteen (four in Aeschylus, four in Sophocles, one in Ibycus, one in Callimachus, one in Euphorion, plus the two medical passages), and the three exceptions are, as Pearson says, the Nicander and the two Lycophron passages – that is, three of the five instances known from Hellenistic verse.

(iv) Two obvious questions present themselves: where does Galen get his information from? and why is he so selective with Hellenistic verse? The answer to both questions is surely that his source – not his direct source,[20] but his ultimate source – was Alexandrian, of the same age as (and perhaps even the stimulus for) those three missing instances; the two Hellenistic passages actually cited will have been added subsequently, *en route* to Galen. All that Galen himself tells us is that in his discussion of πέμφιξ he is 'following the grammarians' (τοῖς γραμματικοῖς ἀκολουθήσαντα).[21]

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[19] Galen's discussion is long and not as clear-cut as it might be: *CMG* V 10. 2. 2, 46–54.

[20] For whom Wenkebach conjectured Pamphilus (I A.D.): see *Philologus* 86 (1931), 325, and W. D. Smith, *The Hippocratic Tradition* (1979), 153–5, 160–2; on Hippocratic glossography in general, see M. Wellmann, *Hippokratesglossare* (1931).

[21] *CMG* V 10. 2. 2, 47 f.

We know of various Hippocratic glossographers as early as the third century who might be the underlying source.[22]

(v) Galen's note is extensive and, though its text is not in good shape, there is no obvious reason to suppose it represents any drastic selection from the earlier (Alexandrian) compilations that it depends on. Nor is there any reason to suppose that those compilations selected *their* classical instances of the word from an appreciably larger number: we at least know of no other occurrences. Information-retrieval systems in antiquity were, no doubt, not all that they might have been. Nevertheless, it seems likely, all in all, that what Galen is giving us is a large proportion of all the occurrences of the word πέμφιξ known to the learned and diligent scholars of the Alexandrian age – which means a large proportion of its literary occurrences in classical Greek.

From all of which we must draw two conclusions. If we put aside the medical use of the word and contemplate (*a*) the diversity of its other supposed meanings and (*b*) the likelihood that it was as ill attested in those meanings as it appears to have been, we must conclude that (*c*) its (classical) literary occurrences were its only (classical) occurrences and that (*d*) its apparent meanings can't have been meanings. That is, we cannot now know which, if any, of those meanings the word had *ever* had, but the probability is that by the fifth century (where most of the evidence comes from) it had none of them *as true meanings*. The only thing the word can be said to have *meant* in the classical period is *pustule* or *swelling round a pustule*, the given sense of the two medical passages.[23]

The question when (or how) πέμφιξ developed its medical meaning is another matter. It might have been hoped that study of the word's etymology would shed some light on its classical use, but any such expectation is soon disappointed. The possible cognates of πέμφιξ are πομφός, 'blister', with its presumed derivative πομφόλυξ, 'bubble', and the early epic epithet of the sea, δυσπέμφελος.[24] One might infer from the two latter words that the watery uses of πέμφιξ are original. One might equally infer, however, that the watery uses were engendered precisely by arbitrary association wth δυσπέμφελος and/or πομφόλυξ themselves. And if we can find no *terra firma* from modern, scientific etymology, we can certainly find none from ancient interpretations, etymological or other. Galen's interpretations of the verse uses of πέμφιξ are guesses (his own or his sources') derived from the passages cited. With an obsolete word, such guesses have no authority. Any *evidence* on which an ancient interpretation of an obsolete word is in fact based is of value to us. An interpretation without evidence is of no value, because we have no means of evaluating it: we cannot know how extensive the supporting evidence may have been, what period it belonged to, whether it was correctly interpreted.

V

I wrote above: 'if πέμφιξ was so ill attested in its non-medical meanings, they can't have been meanings'. The non-medical 'meanings' are ill attested, not only because there are few citations for each of them, but because those citations are all from poets, and rather few poets at that. My argument presupposes the importance of distinguishing normal and abnormal word-usage and the application of distributional criteria to

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[22] Xenocritus of Cos, Bacchius of Tanagra and Philinus of Cos: see the succinct comments of Smith (n. 20 above), 202 f., 211 f. and Pfeiffer (n. 7 above), 92, n. 2.

[23] And also, incidentally, alluded to in Nicander's φλύκταιναι.

[24] On δυσπέμφελος see West on Hes. *Th.* 440.

distinguish them.[25] To determine the status of a usage, we find out which writers use it and then draw inferences from the spread of evidence. A word normally used 'means' whatever it appears to. A usage in technical prose (such as Euryphon or the Hippocratic corpus) is sufficient evidence for a meaning. A poet's usage is not.

The third section of T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land* begins:

> The river's tent is broken: the last fingers of leaf
> Clutch and sink into the wet bank.

As speakers of the language, we know what 'river's tent' means. 'Tent' is a metaphor, and we interpret it with reference to leaves overhanging the river. We also know that the *word* 'tent' does not *mean* 'overhanging leaves': in fact, all the force of the metaphor would be lost if it did. And if another poet – say, a generation later – used 'tent' in a similar way, the *word* would still not mean 'overhanging leaves'. And if a dictionary of English were to list *overhanging leaves* as a meaning of the word on the strength of either or both of these two passages, we would see that as folly – unless a whole generation or tradition of poets had used the word that way, and the usage had acquired the status of elevated cliché. πέμφιξ, however, is anything but a cliché, in any of its poetic uses, and what LSJ has done with it, following Galen (but unhelpfully omitting Galen's qualifications), is folly too.

VI

Before we can understand the phenomenon of words *without* meanings, we must take a look at words *with* meanings and, briefly, at meaning itself. There are various ways of approaching meaning, some of them less than helpful in the present context.[26] We are concerned with the impact of verbal communication on its reader or listener, and we require an emphasis on the time-honoured notion of conceptual reference: as I read or hear a word, I identify and conceptualize it, I look it up in the 'dictionary of the mind', I thereby assign a *reference* to it. I may then relate that conceptual entity to its *referent*: that is, to a corresponding something in the 'real' world, whether a physical object or process or condition of that world, or a relationship between items or events in it, or my experience of any of these.[27] While the complete process of conveying meaning clearly involves referent as well as reference, for many purposes, including ours, meaning and reference may be taken as effective equivalents.

Many words are polysemic: they possess more than one *denotation*, or established sense. Greek χείρ for instance, meant 'hand', 'body of men', 'hand-shaped implement'.

[25] See *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* (n. 11 above), especially pp. 27–56. The abnormality discussed there was metaphor, but *mutatis mutandis* the discussion applies here too.

[26] Notably twentieth-century behaviourist attempts to construct models of language that ignore mental processes, and not least the spurious antimentalist equation (associated, for instance, with Wittgenstein), 'the meaning is the use'. Whatever the theoretical interest of this equation, its pragmatic value for the lexicographer is akin to the value of Wordsworth's ultra-mentalist proposition, 'poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings', for the practising critic. Poetry may or may not have something to do with spontaneous overflows, but it certainly cannot *be* one itself. Nor can meaning *be* the use; cf. Martin (n. 10 above), 14 ff., and n. 71 below. On linguistic behaviourism see further John Lyons, *Semantics* i (1977), 121 ff., and Martin, 9 ff. My discussion of meaning owes a good deal to Martin's admirable book and a little to Benveniste's distinction between 'signifiance' (a word's meaning *within a language*) and 'sens' (its meaning *in a context*), on which see conveniently T. Todorov in *Mélanges linguistiques offerts à Émile Benveniste* (1975), 509 ff.

[27] The qualifications are designed to cater for abstract expression: cf. Martin (n. 10 above), 68 f. On reference and referent see Lyons (n. 26 above), 95 ff., 174 ff., and Martin, 8 f., 25 ff., 68 ff.

Most, if not all, words in any case possess a multiplicity of *connotations*, or associated ideas.[28] We may think of the total semantic content of a word in use as a circle with a set of concentric rings around it and no clearly defined periphery. The circle contains the word's denotations, and at its centre is the particular one (not necessarily the most common one) which is determined by a particular context. Outside the circle are rings of connotations, which become more diffuse the further they are from the centre of the circle.[29] The inner rings are made up of predictable collocations: with χείρ, for instance, notions of 'left' and 'right', ἀριστερά and δεξία, or 'lifting', αἴρειν, because we are used to αἴρειν χεῖρας. The outer rings involve less predictable collocations, such as literary uses from the past, which are not 'meanings' in any ordinary sense at all.

Imagine χείρ in ordinary operation. The required sense – say, 'body of men' – is indicated by our knowledge of the word's denotative range together with the given context. Figure 1 illustrates this commonplace process:

The process is sometimes more complicated, notably in literary discourse where language is used tropically. Figure 2 illustrates interpretation of Eliot's metaphor, 'river's tent':

[28] This essentially literary-critical use of 'denotation' and 'connotation' differs from those favoured by semantic theorists, on which cf. Lyons (n. 26 above), 175 f.

[29] The model is a modified version of one discussed by Martin (n. 10 above), 23, 42.

For context (or 'tenor') we are given 'the river's'. Then comes 'tent', clearly belonging to a new terminology (the 'vehicle'), which proves to be parallel to the first. 'Tent' has a well-known reference, which the given context precludes: the ordinary meaning is quickly evoked, only to be as quickly rejected. Instead, the context encourages us somehow to sense the 'suppressed tenor' – some literal 'equivalent', like 'overhanging leaves' – in its absence. The result is an extra dimension, with two separate circles and a sensuous effect, as if we experienced the referent directly without conceptualization.[30]

VII

πέμφιξ and αἰανής, in their classical usages, represent a quite different phenomenon, which I propose we call an *iconym*. Meaning presupposes communication within a stable speech-community, in which users of words know if they are used wrongly or oddly. A word's meaning is guaranteed primarily by communal use; in a literate, but not bookish, community before the advent of dictionaries, its meaning is guaranteed *only* by communal use. If a word becomes obsolete in the speech-community, it may survive passively, or as a fossil in set phrases, like religious formulae. Any appreciable development of literary uses without these restrictions will create an iconym. The exceptionally full information available for πέμφιξ suggests how commonly used such a new creation is liable to be.

An iconym, then, is a purely literary phenomenon. The word 'iconym' I coin on the analogy of such formations as pseudonym and metonym, and (not inappropriately, perhaps) I derive its main element from more than one word: from εἰκάζειν, because the reader of an iconym can only *guess* what it means – and though he may suppose he sometimes guesses with εἰκός, *probability*, it is never with certainty; from εἰκών, because there is a *semblance* of signification about an iconym, possibly a hint of an *image*, even, but its meaning is really no more than a *phantom*; above all, from εἰκῇ, because the scatter of guessed 'meanings' that eventually collects around an iconym is essentially *arbitrary*. An iconym is a word which has lost its denotations. Its usage is unpredictable and unstable. It has certain properties which ordinary words do not have, but it has less meaning than any ordinary word has. In this respect, it is at the other end of the semantic scale from metaphor, which has *more* meaning than the ordinary word. Again unlike metaphor, an iconym is best thought of not as a trope, a way of *using* a word (a given word can be used literally or metaphorically), but as a type of word (as, say, a coinage or a swearword is a type of word) with given properties or potentialities which are realized in almost any use.[31] Again unlike metaphor, an iconym makes not for striking effects or pointed suggestions, but for a diffuse imprecision. An iconymic passage in a text may be a difficult passage, but where the difficulties associated with metaphor tend to 'explode' (to use Gerard Manley Hopkins' expression),[32] those associated with iconymy tend to linger, like a haze.

As a model for the workings of an iconym, I suggest Figure 3:

[30] This view of metaphor is essentially the one taken in *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* (n. 11 above), especially pp. 9–12, 103 f.; see also W. Nowottny, *The Language Poets Use* (1962), 49 ff.

[31] On this point, cf. p. 313 below.

[32] In a letter to Robert Bridges, 8 October 1879.

Context

Aurally
influenced
associations

An iconym has no circle, no centre. It has only a few faint scattered connotations:
a set of random associations, like ghostly rings, perhaps randomly overlapping, but
largely unrelatable, and all in all leading nowhere. The random associations will
consist partly of earlier literary contexts (from which the knowledge of the word
presumably comes), partly, perhaps, of aural associations of the kind we tend to read
as 're-etymology'. There is a diffuse reference, then, too diffuse to begin to derive a
referent from it. If we invoke a referent, we do so via the context. But the context,
by itself, will rarely be sufficient for that.

Take the pair of πέμφιξ passages listed by LSJ under 'ray', namely Aeschylus, *fr.*
369 Mette (170 Nauck) and Sophocles, *fr.* 338. In full, the passages run:

(A.)   ἂς οὔτε πέμφιξ ἡλίου προσδέρκεται
       οὔτ' ἀστερωπὸν ὄμμα Λητῴας κόρης

those on which neither the πέμφιξ of the sun looks nor the eye of the moon.

(S.)   κἂν ἐθαύμασας | τηλέσκοπον πέμφιγα χρυσέαν ἰδών

and you would have marvelled at the sight of the golden πέμφιξ that watches/is watched from
afar.

Galen's comments, in his discussion of the Hippocratic πεμφιγώδης are:[33] ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
ἀκτίνων αὐτῶν δοκεῖ χρῆσθαι τῷ τῆς πέμφιγος ὀνόματι Σοφοκλῆς...οὕτω καὶ
Αἰσχύλος...– in this pair of passages, Sophocles and likewise Aeschylus 'apparently
use the word πέμφιξ of the sun's rays'. Hence LSJ's classification. But Galen's
comment is a guess at the *referent*. From the context, he – or his sources – infers that
what the tragedians are talking about is what we call the sun's rays. As a matter of
fact, the referent might as well be the *halo* of the sun[34] – or the ball of the sun, and
so on. However, none of these guesses (*pace* LSJ) is a guess at the *word's* meaning,
that is its *reference*. Contrast a metaphor, like Eliot's 'river's tent'. We can know what
the passage is about – that is, we can know what the referent is – *because* 'tent' is a
word with a stable reference. With πέμφιξ there is no stable reference (outside the
medical sense), and the referent is correspondingly obscure.

[33] *CMG* V 10. 2. 2, 49.
[34] For what it may be worth, I note that haloes are roughly the same shape as parts
surrounding pustules. It could equally well be argued that the referents are different – and
Pearson for one (on S. *fr.* 338) believes that the Sophoclean words 'refer to the brightness of
the golden fleece'.

VIII[35]

What are the symptoms of iconymy? Specifically, how are we to recognize an iconym in classical Greek? In the first place, such words are restricted to verse, especially elevated verse. There is an exception to this rule. As with πέμφιξ, there may be a restricted prose usage of the word, to which, however, the iconymic verse uses are not, or not obviously, related. In a case like this, it may well be that the medical πέμφιξ was, or was felt to be, a 'different word', a homonym of the poetic πέμφιξ –[36] just as we feel that 'ear' of corn and 'ear' on the head are different words (as they are, etymologically) or 'lark' (a bird) and 'lark' (a frolic) (etymologically, probably not). For practical purposes, certainly, we may as well assume this – and so preserve the otherwise clear distinction between iconyms (types of words) and tropes (uses of words).

In the second place, the various attested applications of the iconymic word do not lend themselves to the ordinary lexicographical differentiation into discrete but related senses.[37] Some of the uses may well resist any classification. Alternatively, the innocent lexicographer will be reduced to classifying them on the same principle whereby LSJ classifies the uses of πέμφιξ, which yields a spectacularly high proportion of different meanings to occurrences. What will be lacking is a stable centre to which the other uses can be related, or a well-attested use from which the other uses can be derived. With πέμφιξ there is one sufficiently well-attested use (the medical one), but nothing can be derived from it. With αἰανής there are possible *etymologies* (like the etymology from αἰεί), but there is no sufficiently well-attested *use*, and even if one is prepared to accept the kind of semantic development proposed ('everlasting, perpetual, hence...wearisome, persistent'), the word remains a problem.

Thirdly, the word is used in its unrelatable ways by more than one poet. If all the problem examples are in a single author's work, we would not be justified in speaking of iconymy: the natural reading would be that here we have a poet's private associations at work. Even an iconym has a communal basis, then, and there must be a spread of evidence to imply the communality.[38]

From this last consideration it perhaps follows that an instance like κύμβαχος, which involves merely two passages from the *Iliad*, is not strictly an iconym – even if the number of poets involved in any such Homeric transaction is hardly a known quantity. We might content ourselves with noting that κύμβαχος is at least not a very *productive* iconym. But with this criterion in mind, we should certainly not ascribe iconymy to an example like ἀγήνωρ, whose coverage in LSJ is as follows:

> **ἀγηνόρειος**, Dor. ἀγανόρ-, α, ον, = ἀγήνωρ, A. *Pers.* 1026.
> **ἀγην-ορέω** [ᾰ], *to be valiant*, Nonn. *D.* 12. 206, 37. 338, al. **-ορία**, ἡ, *manliness, courage*, of men, Il. 22. 457; *arrogance, pride*, in pl., 9. 700; sg., Nonn. *D.* 42. 384, *AP*10. 75. 7 (Pall.), etc.; of a lion, Il. 12. 46. **-ωρ**, Dor. **ἀγάνωρ**, ορος, ὁ, ἡ, (ἀγα-, ἀνήρ) poet. Adj. *manly, heroic*, θυμός Il. 2. 276, 12. 300; κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀ. 9. 635, etc.; βίῃ καὶ ἀγήνορι θυμῷ εἴξας, of a lion, 24. 42: freq. with collat. notion of

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[35] From this point I broadly follow principles and procedures set out in *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* (n. 11 above), chs. 2 and 4. *Inter alia*, I do not appeal to material later than the fourth century B.C. either as prospective iconyms or as evidence about them (cf. *Interaction*, 38–42, 82) – even though Hellenistic usage in particular often shows discussible developments. Such was the artificial linguistic milieu of the Hellenistic littérateur (pertinently represented by his access to – and his academic interest in – lists of γλῶτται from earlier literature compiled by others like himself), that only confusion can result from taking pre-Hellenistic and Hellenistic together.

[36] In Lyons' terms (n. 26 above, I. 18 ff.), the two would be different 'lexemes'. The distinction between polysemy and homonymy is hard to draw on any level (ibid. II. 550–69).

[37] Which current linguistics finds problematic in itself: e.g. Lyons (n. 26 above), II. 553 f.

[38] cf. Silk (n. 11 above), 35 and 37, n. 7.

headstrong, arrogant, of Achilles, 9. 699; Thersites, 2. 276; the suitors, *Od.* 1. 106, 144,
al.; the Titans, Hes. *Th.* 641, cf. *Op.* 7; the Seven against Thebes, A. *Th.* 124 (lyr.).
2. of animals and things, *stately, magnificent*, ἵππος Pi. *O.* 9. 23; *lavish*, μισθός *P.* 3.
55; πλοῦτος ib. 10. 18; κόμπος *I.* 1. 43.

If one judged the question simply on the basis of the applications listed in LSJ, and
particularly the series listed under '2, of animals and things', but *without* reference
to the provenance of this second set of uses, one might well be tempted to take the
word – which was doubtless obsolete by the fifth century – as a possible iconym. As
it is, the odd uses cited (with μισθός, πλοῦτος, κόμπος) are all from Pindar.[39] Outside
these Pindaric uses, the word is reasonably stable. What we have here, therefore, is
not an iconym, but an otherwise stable archaism, subjected to various idiosyncratic
uses (tropical or other) by a single poet – which (I note in passing) is the kind of
conclusion we might reasonably hope to find summarized in a theoretically sophisticated
Greek lexicon.

The three properties I have listed are preconditions of iconymy. Certain other
features are often visible, but not in themselves necessary:

(i) The word is often epic in origin, and either already iconymic there or else revived
as an iconym later. However, there are exceptions: neither αἰανής nor πέμφιξ, for
instance, is known to be epic.

(ii) We sometimes find a sudden fashion for the word. πέμφιξ, for instance, is
attested once before the fifth century (in Ibycus), then eight times in Aeschylus and
Sophocles. The fact that we have much more extant Greek literature from some
periods than others is obviously a factor to be taken into account, but cannot be held
solely responsible for (e.g.) the πέμφιξ distribution.

(iii) Alternatively, we find that though several authors use the iconym, *one* of them
has a quite disproportionate taste for it. αἰανής, for instance, is evidently an
Aeschylean *Lieblingswort*.[40] Of the sixteen certain pre-Hellenistic instances of the word
(all but three of which are in LSJ), eight are from Aeschylus.[41]

(iv) As with αἰανής, uses of the word are liable to involve re-etymology: that is,
the aural characteristics of the word are seen to be conditioning its application. αἰανής
is aurally open to association with either αἰαί or αἰεί, and some of the contexts in
which we find the word suggest that re-etymology is exerting a pull in one direction
or the other. This does not in itself invest the word with full 'meaning', nor does it
have any bearing on the actual etymology of the word. It rather bears on the author's
intention.

The relation between meaning and intention is a vexed topic which I have discussed
elsewhere.[42] Meaning is determined not by an individual's intentions, conscious or

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[39] Whereas Pindar's application of the word to ἵππος is more or less relatable to the Homeric
applications of ἀγηνορία and ἀγήνωρ itself to a lion (*Il.* 12. 46 and 24. 42 respectively). For a useful
discussion of ἀγήνωρ in some of its other aspects, see A. Sideras, *Aeschylus Homericus* (1971),
42.

[40] So E. Degani, *Helikon* 2 (1962), 43, in the course of a compendious study of the word (pp.
37–56).

[41] The missing citations are Pi. *I.* 3. 2. (with κόρος), A. *fr.* 442. 2 Mette (with βίος), and *Mel.
Adesp.* S 458. 1. 3 (apparently quasi-adverbial, δυσμογέων αἰηνές). The adjective was also
conjectured by Ahrens at A. *Ch.* 68, and one derivative is attested in Aeschylus: δυσαιανῆ
βοάν, *Pe.* 281. It may be noted that the Corcyra inscription cited by LSJ (*IG* 9 (1) 886. 2) is
post-classical.

[42] *Interaction in Poetic Imagery*, 59–63, 233–5. See further the essays collected by D. Newton–de
Molina in *On Literary Intention* (1976), although I confess that some of the contributors,
especially the 'pro-intentionalists', seem to me deficient in the sharp focusing required to assist
scrutiny of the question.

unconscious, but by the immediate context and the communal language as a whole (i.e. by the role the word is seen or known to play in those two complexes). Authors do have intentions and the author's *choice* of words is no doubt to be correlated with them, but that is not the same thing. Meanings are usually recoverable (from the immediate context and the language as a whole). Intentions are often not – unless we arbitrarily assume that recoverable meanings correspond to them, which is merely to beg the question by redefining 'intention' as meaning. However, there are cases where intentions are certainly recoverable, and in the case of a re-etymologized iconym we have the unusual phenomenon of a recoverable intention *without* a recoverable meaning. When Aeschylus writes εἰς τὸν αἰανῆ χρόνον (*Eum.* 572), he is evidently associating the word αἰανής with αἰεί. His intention – *unlike the meaning* of the word – is plain. One may say, 'it meant that to Aeschylus', but language is not idiolect, and meaning is not determined by private association. '"But glory doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument'"', Alice objected. "When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less."' If Humpty Dumpty were right (which he is not), iconyms would not be the linguistic exception, but the rule.

IX

I come now to a short list of examples, arranged in a miniature typology in order to show the range of the type. I do not claim to know how many iconyms there ever were in classical Greece: I suggest, between ten and a hundred. The short list is certainly a representative sample.

One clearly definable type consists of words which were apparently or conceivably iconymic in epic and certainly thereafter. My first instance is ἀλίαστος, for which LSJ offers the following:

> **ἀλίαστος, ον**, (λιάζομαι) *not to be turned aside, unabating,* μάχη, ὅμαδος, γόος, Il. 14. 57, 12. 471, 24. 760; πόλεμον δ᾽ ἀ. ἔγειρε 20. 31; ἀ. ἀνίη Hes. *Th.* 611: neut. as Adv., μηδ᾽ ἀλίαστον ὀδύρεο Il. 24. 549, cf. φρὴν ἀλίαστος φρίσσει E. *Hec.* 85. **2.** = πολύς, κῦμα A. R. 1. 1326, acc. to Sch., cf. *EM* 63. 33. **II.** of persons, *undaunted,* E. *Or.* 1479. – Ep. word, used twice by E. in lyr.

'Not to be turned aside, unabating', says LSJ, which is no more than usually misleading for its treatment of an iconym – but in fairness let us note that at least the evidence it cites, though incomplete, is adequate.[43] ἀλίαστος, superficially, is a surprising case of iconymy, because the word appears to have a transparent etymology, from λιάζεσθαι, 'draw back' or 'sink'. Semantically, however, the word is clearly at some remove from its parent. In the epic the word is applied to battle (μάχη) and the din of battle (ὅμαδος) and 'wailing', γόος; then to 'distress' (ἀνίη) in Hesiod. There is a curious adverbial use in the *Iliad*, μηδ᾽ ἀλίαστον ὀδύρεο – in the context of wailing, but perhaps speculatively associated with λίαν (λίην), 'too much'. In Euripides' *Hecuba* the word is elusively used by Hecuba of her φρήν and its apprehensions (οὔποτ᾽ ἐμὰ φρὴν ὧδ᾽ ἀλίαστος | φρίσσει, 85 f.) and in *Orestes* of the intrepid Pylades (ἔναντα δ᾽ ἦλθε Πυλάδης | ἀλίαστος, 1478 f.), this time apparently re-etymologized from λιάζεσθαι itself (as it were, 'the man who never

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[43] In terms of quantity of evidence, as a matter of fact, LSJ tends to be very much better with rare words than ordinary ones (on which I refer to my comments in *Interaction in Poetic Imagery*, 83). The instances of ἀλίαστος not cited by LSJ are newly discovered and/or scrapings: B.(?) *fr.* 60. 10 f. ἀλι[άστοις] ὑπὸ πένθεσιν, *Trag. Adesp. P. Ox.* 3216. 7 ἀλίαστον (no context), E. *fr.* 1123 dub. ἀλίαστον (no context, but perhaps unjustly suspected by Nauck).

draws back'?).[44] The adjective has been discussed by Erbse, who interpreted it as 'inescapable' (*unentrinnbar*), thereby finding a meaning sufficiently vague to fit all or most of the Homeric examples (though hardly the Euripidean), and just about relatable to λιάζεσθαι. With the traditional interpretations, Erbse warns, the word becomes an 'empty epithet'.[45] Indeed.

Another example is αἶθοψ, 'fiery-looking', according to LSJ, 'epithet of metal...and of wine...once of smoke', and then ('metaph.') 'fiery, keen':

> **αἶθοψ**, οπος, (αἰθός, ὄψ) *fiery-looking*, in Hom. as epith. of metal, *flashing*, αἴθοπι χαλκῷ Il. 4. 495, etc.; and of wine, *sparkling* (or '*fiery*', cf. Epigr. ap. Luc. *Dips.* 6), αἴθοπα οἶνον 4. 259, etc.; once of smoke, *mixed with flame* (cf. αἴθαλος), Od. 10. 152; αἰ. φλογμός, λαμπάς, E. *Supp.* 1019, *Ba.* 594 (both lyr.).   **2.** *black*, Opp. *H.* 1. 133, etc.; αἴθοπι κισσῷ *App. Anth.* 3. 166 (Procl.).   **II.** metaph., *fiery, keen*, λιμός Hes. *Op.* 363; μῶμος Tim. *Pers.* 223; δίψη Nonn. *D.* 15. 7; βασκανίη *AP* 5. 217 (Agath.).

Compare and contrast the full facts:

αἴθοπα οἶνον *Il.* 1. 462 (+8); *Od.* 2. 57 (+11); Hes. *Op.* 592 (+1)

αἴθοπι οἴνῳ *Il.* 23. 237 (+2)

αἴθοπι χαλκῷ *Il.* 4. 495 (+9), *Od.* 21. 434, Hes. *Sc.* 135

οἶνον αἴθοπα E. *fr.* 896. 3

αἴθοπα καπνόν *Od.* 10. 152

αἴθοπα λιμόν Hes. *Op.* 363

ἀήτη δ' αἴθοπα *Mel. Adesp.* S. 473. 4

[ἀνδρὸς αἴθοπος S. *Aj.* 221 (v.l., Kamerbeek)]

αἴθοπι μώμῳ Timoth. 15. 210

αἴθοπι φλογμῷ E. *Supp.* 1019

αἴθοπα λαμπάδα E. *Ba.* 594.

The word is common in two epic contexts: as epithet of οἶνον (or οἴνῳ) and as epithet of χαλκῷ. The former use is recalled by Euripides, *fr.* 896. 3, where the epithet is learnedly 'explained' by reference to the fact that the sun ripens grapes and one of the horses of the sun was called Αἶθοψ. The remaining extant uses are remarkably diverse: of smoke (once in the *Odyssey*); of hunger (once in Hesiod); of wind (once in a bit of anonymous lyric); of Ajax (s.v.l., once in Sophocles); of blame (once in Timotheus); and then two instances in Euripides of φλογμός and λαμπάς, which look back to the *Odyssey* passage (with καπνός) and/or to a re-etymological 'connection' with αἴθειν, 'kindle, burn'.

The example nicely illustrates the difference between etymology and meaning. We may well accept the common suggestion that *originally* αἶθοψ had to do with 'burning' and was derived from the same stem as αἴθειν. But that 'original' state is evidently pre-historic. The predominant Homeric-Hesiodic uses are in formulae which no longer evoke it. The *Odyssey* phrase, αἴθοπα καπνόν, may be a relic of that earlier state or itself imply a re-etymology. Either way, the word is now a *prima facie* iconym, and is unquestionably one by the fifth century.[46]

And a third instance, ἄωτος (or -ον). LSJ s.v.:

> **ἄωτον** [ᾱ], τό, and ἄωτος, ὁ, *the choicest, the flower of its kind*: in Hom. mostly of the *finest wool*, οἰὸς ἄωτον Il. 13. 599, 716, Od. 1. 443; without οἰός (which must be

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[44] At *Or.* 1479 speculatively emended (essentially on metrical grounds) to ἄλαστος by Biehl (following Wilamowitz) in his 1965 Berlin edition and the 1975 Teubner.

[45] *Glotta* 32 (1953), 236–8.

[46] The presumption of an original etymological connection between αἶθοψ and αἰθ-, 'burn', does not justify the decision of *Lex. fr.-gr. Ep.* to make a composite article out of αἶθοψ, αἴθων *et al.*

supplied from the context), *flock, down*, 9. 434; once of the *finest linen*, λίνοιό τε λεπτὸν
ἄωτον Il. 9. 661; of the golden fleece, χρύσεον ἄωτον A.R. 4. 176, cf. Orph. *A.* 1336;
ἄκρον ἄωτον [ὕδατος], of *pure* water, Call. *Ap.* 112; of the *foam* on a wave, κύματος
ἄκρῳ ἀ. Id. *Hec.* 1. 4. 3; μέλιτος ἀ. γλυκύς Pi. *Pae.* 6. 59: freq. in Pi., ἄ. ζωᾶς *the
prime* or *flower* of life, Id. *I.* 5(4). 12; ἄ. στεφάνων *the fairest* of . . ., ib. 6(5). 4, cf. *O.*
5. 1; Χαρίτων ἄ. their *fairest gift*, Id. *I.* 8(7). 16; σοφίας ἄκρος ἄ. the *choicest gift*
of minstrel's art, ib. 7(6). 18; ἄ. γλώσσας, i.e. a song, ib. 1. 51; ὕμνων Id. *P.* 10. 53;
δίκας ἄ. Id. *N.* 3. 29; 'Αφροδίτας . . . ἄωτον A. *Supp.* 666 (lyr.): rarely in pl.,
στεφάνων ἄωτοι Pi. *O.* 9. 19; ἡρώων ἄωτοι Id. *N.* 8. 9; ρόδων ἄωτοι Simon. 148:
in Epitaphs, θνῄσκω . . . ἀκμᾶς ἐν ἀώτῳ *in the flower* of youth, *IG* 3. 1328; τὸν . . . ἄωτον
τοῦ δήμου *CIG* 2804, cf. *Epigr. Gr.* 455.   II. *that which gives honour and glory* to a
thing, ἄ. ἵππων *a song in praise of* horses, Pi. *O.* 3. 4; χειρῶν ἄ. ἐπίνικον Id. *O.* 8.
75. – The gender is indeterminate in Hom. and A.; Pi. always has ἄωτος, and so Theoc.
13. 27; A.R. and later Ep. ἄωτον (Opp. *C.* 4. 154, οἰὸς ἄωτα in pl.).

I have discussed this word elsewhere.[47] It occurs five times in Homer: three times
as if it meant 'wool' (οἰὸς ἄωτον); once of the ram's fleece in *Odyssey* 9; once of linen,
in the phrase λίνοιο . . . ἄωτον. The word occurs thereafter twenty-three times before
the Hellenistic period; twenty of these occurrences are in Pindar. There is a little, but
not much, evidence of association with flowers.[48] In most of the twenty-three cases
it is *possible* to interpret the word vaguely as 'the choicest, the finest', as is traditionally
done, although ingenuity has to be stretched to cope with phrases like δίκας ἄωτος
in Pindar's *Nemean* 3, let alone πολιατᾶν καὶ ξένων γλώσσας ἄωτον in *Isthmian* 1.
In the latter case, where the referent is approximately 'song in praise', even LSJ gives
up the attempt and simply observes, 'i.e. a song'. As a matter of fact, half of Pindar's
uses are connected with song:[49] perhaps he associated the word with ἀοιδά?

The proper conclusion for the literary lexicographer of ἄωτος is that the word is:
(*a*) an iconym, certainly by the fifth century; (*b*) vaguely complimentary; (*c*) favoured
by Pindar; (*d*) generally used in some kind of genitival phrase. An interesting
perspective on the word's prehistory is provided by the apparent occurrence of a
cognate form in Linear B, seemingly as a man's name,[50] but this has no bearing on
the classical state of affairs. The word is *both* an iconym *and* subjected to Pindar's
idiolectal creativity. It is futile to try and fabricate stable meanings from that.

                                            X

In these last examples the iconym seems to begin its iconymic existence in epic. Some
instances appear to involve no such epic background. πέμφιξ and αἰανής are two of
them, and another is ξουθός. The interpretation of this word, in LSJ and elsewhere,
is a classic case of misplaced ingenuity. LSJ's article cites the bulk of the pre-Hellenistic
evidence, as follows:

   ξουθόπτερος, ον, *with nimble* (or perh. *humming*) *wings*, μέλισσα(ι) E. *HF* 487, *Fr.*
   467. 4, *Lyr. Alex. Adesp.* 7. 13.

[47] *Interaction in Poetic Imagery*, 239 f. and 101 (on *P.* 10. 53 f.).
[48] Ibid.
[49] As *O.* 1. 15 μουσικᾶς ἐν ἀώτῳ: cf. *O.* 3. 3 f., *P.* 10. 53, *I.* 1. 51, *I.* 7. 18, *I.* 8. 16a, *fr.* 6b
(f), *fr.* 52 f. 59, and, more distantly or tenuously, *O.* 5. 1, *O.* 8. 75, *O.* 9. 19, *I.* 5. 12 (in which
instance there is perhaps a faint allusion to 'wool' through ποιμαίνοντι; cf. R. Stoneman, *Maia*
33 (1981), 130).
[50] KN Dd 1157 has the sequence *a-wo-ti-jo*, which C. J. Ruijgh, *Études sur la grammaire et
le vocabulaire du grec mycénien* (1967), 158, interprets as 'ΑϜώτιος or 'ΑϜωτίων, a shepherd's
name (and certainly found in the vicinity of the sign for 'ovis'), 'dérivé de *ἄϜωτος (> ἄωτος),
flocon (de laine), laine fine'.

ξουθός, ή, όν, *rapidly moving to and fro, nimble*, φεύγετε τῆς ξουθῆς δειλότεροι κεμάδος Herodic. ap. Ath. 5. 222a; κόμαι... ξουθοῖσιν ἀνέμοις ἐνετρύφων φορού-μεναι in the *rustling* breezes, Chaerem. 1. 7; ξ. ἀλκυόνες *AP* 9. 333 (Mnasalc.); ξ. πτέρυγες *rustling, whirring* wings of the Dioscuri, *h. Hom.* 33. 13; *whirring* or *steadily-beating* wings of the eagle, B. 5. 17; ξουθᾶν ἐκ πτερύγων ἁδὺ κρέκουσα μέλος, of the cricket, *AP* 7. 192 (Mnasalc.).   **2.** *chirruping* or *trilling* larynx of the nightingale, ἐλθὲ διὰ ξουθᾶν γενύων ἐλελιζομένα θρήνοις ἐμοῖς ξυνεργός E. *Hel.* 1111 (lyr.); ἐλελιζομένη διεροῖς μέλεσιν γένυος ξουθῆς Ar. *Av.* 214 (anap.); δι' ἐμῆς γένυος ξουθῆς μελέων Πανὶ νόμους ἱερούς ἀναφαίνω ib. 744 (lyr) of the nightingale itself, *trilling*, οἷά τις ξουθά...Ἴτυν Ἴτυν στένουσ'...ἀηδών A. *Ag.* 1142 (lyr); ὦ φίλη, ὦ ξουθή, ὦ φίλτατον ὀρνέων πάντων Ar. *Av.* 676 (lyr.), cf. Theoc. *Ep.* 4. 11; of song-birds in general, ξ. λιγύφωνα ὄρνεα Lyr. Alex. Adesp. 7. 1; ξ. χελιδών *twittering* swallow, Babr. 118. 1.   **3.** of the bee, either *nimble*, or *humming* (cf. ξουθόπτερος), S. *Fr.* 398. 5, E. *IT* 165 (anap.), 635, Pl. *Epigr.* 32. 6, Antiph. 52. 7, Theoc. 7. 142, *AP* 9. 226. 1 (Zon.), v.l. in *APl.* 4. 305. 3 (Antip.).   **4.** of the sound produced by a trilling larynx or vibrating wing, ξουθὸν μέλος (of a song-bird) *chirruping* note, Opp. *H.* 4. 123; οὔρεσι καὶ σκιεραῖς ξουθὰ λαλεῦντα νάπαις, of the τέττιξ, *AP* 9. 373. 4.   **5.** ξ. ἱππαλεκτρυών perh. *nimble* horse-cock, A. *Fr.* 134, parodied in Ar. *Pax* 1177, *Av.* 800, *Ra.* 932.   **II.** *golden yellow*, ξουθῶν τε σπονδὰς μελιτῶν Emp. 128. 7 (ap. Porph. *Abst.* 2. 21; ξανθῶν ap. Ath. 12. 510d); ξουθὸς μὲν πρόπαν εἶδος, of a species of wolf, Opp. *C.* 3. 297 (ξανθὸς one cod.); but ξουθὸν ἀπ' ἀνέρος αἷμα πάσασθαι red blood, Opp. *H.* 2. 452 (v.l. ξανθὸν ὑπ').

It is worth noting, for the sake of completeness, that the name Ξοῦθος occurs in Hesiod and apparently in Linear B as a man's name and the name of an ox.[51] The extant occurrences of the adjective ξουθός begin in the sixth century, if that is the date of Homeric Hymn 33 (the fourth citation in LSJ). In the classical period the word is generally used of flying creatures (which LSJ omits to say), though not always: it is used of winds by the tragedian Chaeremon (*vid.* I.1 in LSJ)[52] and conceivably (if the text could be trusted) of honey by Empedocles (ibid. II). Even in connection with flying creatures, the word lacks all stability. It is used sometimes of birds, sometimes of bees, sometimes of wings (including the wings of the Dioscuri in the Homeric Hymn), sometimes of throats (nightingales' throats). There is also ξουθόπτερος, epithet of bees in Euripides. *Sometimes* the word could be taken as a colour word (with or without re-etymological assimilation to ξανθός). *Usually* it could be taken as a description of sound, but, if so, the sounds vary very greatly. LSJ, beginning improperly with a set consisting largely of later examples, offers its readers 'rapidly moving to and fro', 'chirruping', 'nimble' (or 'humming'), and the problematic 'golden yellow'. Commentators are moved to note 'the strange ambiguity of this attribute between colour, sound and movement' and to relate this to Greek modes of colour-perception.[53] More to the point, Eduard Fraenkel, and Wilamowitz before him, observed that by the fifth century the word was 'scarcely understood'.[54] For want of a theory of iconymy, however, Fraenkel still hankered after an ordinary denotation for the word, and duly suggested that in the fifth century ξουθός was 'always taken to refer to colour'.[55] A

[51] Hes. *fr.* 9. 2; PY Jn 389 and KN Ch 900 (*ko-so-u-to-*); the proper name occurs also at *Dialexeis* 5. 11, on which see n. 55 below.

[52] Winds are themselves sometimes represented as flying creatures, but usually in visual art, rarely in words: cf. D. L. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (1981), 365, Roscher, *Lex. Myth.*, s.vv. *Boreas, Windgötter*, K. Neuser, *Anemoi* (1982), 232 f.

[53] Dale on E. *Hel.* 1111.

[54] Fraenkel on *Ag.* 1142; Wilamowitz on E. *HF* 488.

[55] loc. cit.; cf. e.g. Kannicht on E. *Hel.* 1111. Perhaps the best evidence for a classical association with colour (though not for a classical *meaning*) is the sole occurrence of the word not cited by LSJ, *Dialexeis* 5. 11 (cf. n. 51 above). Here the writer gives a list of three pairs of words, the members of which differ by accent (ἁρμονία): Γλαῦκος καὶ γλαυκὸς καὶ Ξάνθος καὶ

recent discussion by Dürbeck credits it instead with a reference to sound (and eventually movement) combined with an 'affective' connotation, for which modern languages are said to provide no equivalent.[56] The proper conclusion is rather that from the fifth century the word is an iconym with several competing connotations, but no stable centre. Whether the word 'meant' something more definite in the Homeric Hymn is impossible to say: the same could be said of the earliest use of πέμφιξ (in Ibycus).

XI

Sometimes an epic iconym simply lapses into obsolescence within the epic sphere itself. This is the case with two words widely regarded as problematic, λειριόεις (and λείριος) and ὁμοιιος, and one other, δέδηε, which has hitherto escaped any such diagnosis. λειριόεις is another target for misplaced ingenuity, this time from commentators on the look-out for synaesthesia.[57] 'Properly *like a lily*, but in Homer only metaphorical', is LSJ's proem. The whole λειρ- section of LSJ runs:

> **λείρ-ῐνος**, η, ον, *made of lilies*, χρῖσμα Dsc. 3. 102; ἔλαιον Gal. 19. 119.   **II.** *like a lily*, ἄνθος prob. in Thphr. *HP* 3. 18. 11.   **-ιόεις**, εσσα, εν, prop. *like a lily*, but in Hom. only metaph., χρόα λειριόεντα lily skin, Il. 13. 830; of the cicadae, ὄπα λειριόεσσαν their *delicate* voice, 3. 152; of the Muses' voice, Hes. *Th.* 41; Ἑσπερίδες Q.S. 2. 418.   **2.** *of the lily*, κάρη Nic. *Al.* 406.   **-ιον**, τό, *Madonna lily, Lilium candidum*, prob. in Thphr. *HP* 9. 16. 6; = κρίνον, Dsc. 3. 102, cf. *h. Cer.* 427, Hp. *Mul.* 2. 179, A.R. 1. 879.   **II.** *polyanthus narcissus, Narcissus Tazetta*, Thphr. *HP* 6. 8. 1, 7. 13. 4, Dsc. 4. 158.   **III.** *autumn narcissus, Narcissus serotinus*, Thphr. *HP* 6. 6. 9; *narcissus* in general, ib. 1. 13. 2.   **-ιοπολφᾰνεμώνη**, ἡ, *omelet made with lilies*, etc., Pherecr. 130. 8.   **-ιος**, ον, = λειριόεις, ἄνθεμον Pi. *N.* 7. 79.   **II.** of the voice, A.R. 4. 903, Orph. *A.* 253.   **III.** of the eyes of youth, ὄμματα B. 16. 95.   **-ιώδης**, ες, *like a lily*, εὐωδία Thphr. *HP* 3. 13. 6.   **-ός**, ά, όν, = λειριόεις, of the voice, τέττιξ γλυκεροῖς χείλεσι λειρὰ χέων *IG* 14. 1934 *f6*.

λειριόεις occurs once in the *Iliad* of skin (in fact Ajax's), once of the cicadas' voice, once in Hesiod of the Muses' voice. There is also a Greek word λείριον, 'lily' (or 'narcissus'), with an ordinarily stable meaning and contexts in the epic era as well as in classical prose. And then there is λείριος, adjective, which Bacchylides uses of human eyes and Pindar of ἄνθεμον, 'flower', but as periphrasis (most commentators agree) for *coral*. There is also – too recently published for LSJ (or its Supplement) – an adjective λειριόπρυμνος (?! 'lily-stern') recorded in a poetical onomasticon of the mid-third century B.C.[58] No author's name is associated with the word, though I would be prepared to guess that its author was Bacchylides.[59]

ξανθὸς καὶ Ξοῦθος καὶ ξουθός. In each pair the first word is a proper name, the second an adjective; both the first two adjectives, γλαυκός and ξανθός, are colour terms; the likely implication is that the writer took ξουθός the same way. The apparent association of ξουθός with ξανθός is also noteworthy in view of the confusion between the two in our text of Empedocles (cf. LSJ s.v. ξουθός II).

   [56] H. Dürbeck, *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 24 (1968), 9–33. There is a more recent, but no more adequate, discussion by G. Xanthakis-Karamanos, *Studies in Fourth-Century Tragedy* (1980), 83 f.

   [57] E.g. W. B. Stanford, *Phoenix* 23 (1969), 3 ff., E. Irwin, *Colour Terms in Greek Poetry* (1974), 205 ff.

   [58] *P. Hib.* 172. 114. The form λειρός (= λειριόεις) referred to by LSJ occurs only on a late inscription (cited s.v.).

   [59] Bacchylides seems to have been peculiarly fond of -πρυμνος compounds: not only the rare epic form εὔπρυμνος (13. 150: *Il.* 4. 248), but the otherwise unattested αἰολόπρυμνος (1. 114) and λεπτόπρυμνος (17. 119) as well. Outside Bacchylides, ἀμφίπρυμνος and εὔπρυμνος occur in tragedy (see LSJ s.vv.).

The Pindaric use of λείριος is noteworthy. The poet simply assimilates the word to the noun λείριον, the established flower-name, and then uses the product quasi-metaphorically:

Μοῖσά τοι
κολλᾷ χρυσὸν ἔν τε λευκὸν ἐλέφανθ' ἁμᾷ
καὶ λείριον ἄνθεμον ποντίας ὑφελοῖσ' ἐέρσας.

The received opinion that 'λείριον flower' means 'coral' is a guess at the *referent*, and though a plausible guess, it is necessarily a guess. (λείριον, in other words, puts us in the position encountered already with πέμφιξ.)[60] The referent is strictly irrecoverable, whereas the reference (as always where any iconym is involved) is strictly non-existent. However, puzzling over this referent is itself unnecessary, because Pindar is in any case using the product of his quasi-metaphor for a second metaphor, thereby by-passing the first referent for another. 'λείριον flower' means ' ??coral' means (some aspect of Pindar's) 'song'. *Exemplum sui*: the conjuring trick sums up the dexterity in setting off on a new verbal tack which is the immediate topic. At the same time, the notion of Pindar's verbal artistry is informed by a faint impression of *fineness* or *delicacy* which accrues to λείριον through the obvious association with *lilies* and (*via* λειριόεις) through the distant evocation of *voices* and *skin*. The iconym has no denotative force, yet its connotations are, however lightly, put to work.

The connection between the adjectives λείριος (to which, presumably, belongs the λειριο- of λειριόπρυμνος) and λειριόεις is elusive enough to make it hard to know whether we have two iconyms here, or two forms of one iconym. That seems to be the only real question. The 'meaning' of the word, or words, is a will-o'-the-wisp.

With ὁμοίιος the material in LSJ speaks for itself – to us, if not to LSJ:

> ὁμοι-άζω, (ὅμοιος) *to be like*, interpol. in *Ev. Marc.* 14. 70, v. l. in *Ev. Matt.* 23. 27. **II.** trans., *compare, liken*, Diom. p. 365 K. **-εδρος**, ον, *having a similar abode*, Herm. ap. Stob. 1. 49. 69. **-ιος** (A), ον, Ep. Adj. of uncertain meaning, perh. *distressing* (= κακός acc. to Anon. ap. Apollon. *Lex.*, also expld. as *common to all* or *impartial*, ibid., Hsch., cf. ξυνός), ἀλλά σε γῆρας τείρει ὁ. Il. 4. 315, cf. *h. Ven.* 244; θάνατος Od. 3. 236; νεῖκος Il. 4. 444; πόλεμος 9. 440, 13. 358, 15. 670, al. (In place of ὁμοιίου (◡– – –) πολέμοιο ὁμοιίοο πτολέμοιο shd. be restored.) **-ιος** (B), ον, Ep. (not in Hom.) for ὅμοιος, πατὴρ παίδεσσιν ὁμοίιος *like in mind or wish, at one with*, Hes. *Op.* 182; δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος Xenoph. 23. 2; θηκτοῖσιν ὁμοίιος ἦεν ἀκωκαῖς Pancrat. *Oxy.* 1085. 23; χἀ νύξ..ἴσα καὶ ὁμοίιος ἀώς *night and day are equal*, Bion *Fr.* 15. 18.

ὁμοίιος (A), 'epic adjective of uncertain meaning, perhaps *distressing*' – and perhaps not. The 'uncertainty' is to be taken as inherent in the usage, not as corollary of our ignorance. The word is found as epithet of old age, death, strife, and war. Aurally, it obviously recalls the ordinary word ὅμοιος, and it could be that ὁμοίιος (B), 'at one with', is actually ὁμοίιος (A) re-etymologized.[61]

δέδηε is a curious instance, and its treatment in LSJ is particularly misleading:

> δαίω (A), Act. only pres. and impf. (but ἔδευσε may be for ἔδαυσε aor. 1, cf. infr. II, *Berl. Sitzb.* 1902. 1098): – Pass., pres. and impf., Hom.: aor. 2 subj. δάηται Il. 20. 316: also intr. in pf. 2 Act. δέδηα, plpf. δεδήειν (v. infr.); Ep. part. fem. δεδαυῖα Nonn. *D.* 6. 305: aor. part. δαισθείς E. *Heracl.* 914 (if not from δαίνυμι): also aor.

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[60] Above, p. 312. The identification with coral has been doubted: see e.g. Irwin (n. 57 above), 206–8.

[61] For recent discussions of the word see West on Hes. *Op.* 182 and A. N. Athanassakis, *Rh. M.* 119 (1976), 4–7. The latter derives ὁμοίιος (A) from ὁμός + *Ϝίς, crediting it with an original meaning 'levelling' (*gleichmachend*), and sees in (B) an uncomprehending equation of this compound with ὅμοιος.

2 subj. δαβῇ, ἐκδαβῇ, Hsch.: pf. Pass. δέδαυμαι (v. infr. II). (*δαϝ-γω, cf. δε-δαυ-μένος, δαβελός, Skt. *dunôti* 'burn'): – poet. Verb, *light up, kindle*, δαῖε οἱ ἐκ κόρυθός τε καὶ ἀσπίδος ἀκάματον πῦρ *she made* fire *burn* from .., Il. 5. 4, cf. 7; ἐκ δ' αὐτοῦ δαῖε φλόγα 18. 206, cf. 227; so πῦρ καὶ φῶς δ. A. *Ch.* 864 (lyr.); φλόγα Id. *Ag.* 496: metaph., δαῖε δ' ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς .. πόθον A.R. 4. 1147: – Pass., *blaze, burn fiercely*, ἐν πεδίῳ πῦρ δαίετο καῖε δὲ νεκρούς Il. 21. 343; πυρὶ ὄσσε δεδήει *blazed* with fire, 12. 466; ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε δαίεται *blaze like fire*, Od. 6. 132; σεμνῶν ὀργίων ἐδαίετο φλόξ S. *Tr.* 765: mostly metaph. sense, μάχη πόλεμός τε δέδηεν Il. 20. 18, al., cf. 12. 35, 17. 253; Ὄσσα δεδήει Rumour *spread like wild-fire*, 2. 93; φιλοφροσύνη δεδήει *glowed*, Emp. 130. 2. **II.** *burn up*, μῆρ' ἐπὶ βωμῶν *Epigr. Gr.* 1035. 20 (Pergam.); σάρκας ἔδευσε (sic) πυρί Berl. *Sitzb.* l.c.; τὰν χώραν δ. Decr. Byz. ap. D. 18. 90; *use cautery*, Hp. *Haem.* 2 (very rare in Prose): – Pass., φλογὶ σῶμα δαισθείς E. 1. c.; μηρίων δεδαυμένων Semon. 30; ἐν ἔρωτι δεδ., prob. in Call. *Epigr.* 50 (cf. δάκνω III).

The totality of relevant evidence is as follows:

> *Il.* 12. 466 πυρὶ δ' ὄσσε δεδήει
>
> *Il.* 2. 93 μετὰ δέ σφισιν Ὄσσα δεδήει
> 17. 253 ἔρις πολέμοιο δέδηεν
> 12. 35 ἀμφὶ μάχη τ' ἐνοπή τε δεδήει
> 20. 18 μάχη πόλεμός τε δέδηε
> 13. 736 στέφανος πολέμοιο δέδηε
> Hes. *Sc.* 155 ὅμαδός τε φόνος τ' ἀνδροκτασίη τε δεδήει (v. l. φόβος)
> *Od.* 20. 353 οἰμωγὴ δὲ δέδηε
> Emped. 130. 2 φιλοφροσύνη τε δεδήει
> *Il.* 6. 328 f. αὐτή τε πτόλεμός τε/ἄστυ τόδ' ἀμφιδέδηε
> Hes. *Sc.* 62 κόνις δέ σφ' ἀμφιδεδήει.

δέδηα is, no doubt, as LSJ says, in the first place the perfect of δαίω, 'burn'. However, the perfect forms, which are rare and restricted, are nowhere used of literal 'burning', but always differently – and, I take it, iconymically. Whether at some point they ceased to be regarded as parts of 'the same word' as δαίω is possible, perhaps likely. The forms attested are the third singular perfect δέδηε and the corresponding pluperfect δεδήει: in two passages these forms are compounded with ἀμφι-. The only occurrence that has any overt connection with burning is the one in *Iliad* 12, where the hero's 'eyes δεδήει with fire', a usage which it would be natural to interpret as 'blazed with fire', and to relate to an otherwise unique phrase, ἐν δέ οἱ ὄσσε δαίεται (*Od.* 6. 132). This is, in fact, the only visible point of overlap between the usage of δαίειν and δέδηε.

The rest of the usage of δέδηε is notable for its diversity. Remarkably enough, no phrase recurs exactly. The verb is applied to 'rumour', 'battle', 'conflict', 'war', the 'din' of war and the 'στέφανος of war' in the *Iliad*; to 'tumult, murder (or panic flight) and slaughter' and to 'dust' in the Hesiodic *Shield*; to 'lamentation' in *Odyssey* 20; to 'friendliness' in Empedocles. On present evidence, we might conjecture that the usage ὄσσε δεδήει generated (by aural association) ὄσσα δεδήει and thus helped the process of diffusion. For the rest, we need only say that while the natural interpretation of ὄσσε δεδήει is that this is metaphor, the other usages should be seen as examples of iconymy. At what stage of the epic the word became iconymic is hardly a question we can hope to answer, in view of the special nature of epic composition.

XII

It is possible for iconymy to coexist with the restricted stability of an 'ordinary' γλῶττα. This is presumably the case with αἴθοψ, already discussed, and still more clearly in other cases. Take the adjective μαλερός. LSJ s.v. is not impressive:

μᾰλερός, ά, όν, *fierce, raging*, in Hom. always epith. of fire, Il. 9. 242, 20. 316, 21. 375, cf. Hes. *Sc.* 18; πυρὸς μαλερὰ γνάθος A. *Ch.* 325 (lyr.): metaph., *fiery, glowing*, ἀοιδαί Pi. *O.* 9. 22.   **2.** *fierce, violent, terrible*, πόθος A. *Pers.* 62 (anap.); λέοντες Id. *Ag.* 141 (lyr.); ῎Αρης ὁ μ. S. *OT* 190 (lyr.); πόνοι Arist. *Fr.* 675. 5 (lyr.): neut. pl. as Adv., *furiously*, E. *Tr.* 1300 (lyr.).   **II.** μαλεραὶ φρένες, = ἀσθενεῖς, *subdued, prostrate*, Call. *Fr. anon.* 198.

The occurrences, most but not all of which are in LSJ, are best set out in three groups as follows:

(*a*) Il. 9. 242 μαλεροῦ πυρός
       20. 316 μαλερῷ πυρί
       21. 375 μαλερῷ πυρί
   Hes. *Sc.* 18 μαλερῷ...πυρί
   Hom. *Epigr.* 4. 5 μαλεροῖο πυρός
   Orac. ap. Hdt. 7. 140 μαλερῷ πυρί
(*b*) Pi. *O.* 9. 21 f. πόλιν | μαλεραῖς ἐπιφλέγων ἀοιδαῖς
   A. *Ch.* 325 πυρὸς μαλερὰ γνάθος
   S. *OT* 190 ff. ῎Αρεά τε τὸν μαλερόν, ὅς...φλέγει με
   E. *Tro.* 1300 μαλερὰ μέλαθρα πυρὶ κατάδρομα
(*c*) A. *Pe.* 61 f. πᾶσα χθών... | ...πόθῳ στένεται μαλερῷ
   A. *Ag.* 141 δρόσοις ἀέπτοις μαλερῶν λεόντων
   Philox. 836 (e). 10 *PMG* χερσὶ...μαλεραῖς
   Arist. 1. 5 *PMG* πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας.

In the first group (*a*) μαλερός is associated with *fire* as epithet of the noun πῦρ, and in this restricted context the word is entirely stable throughout the hexameter tradition. Then in four fifth-century passages (*b*) the word is used with evident *allusion* to 'fire', but its immediate applications are – quite diversely – to 'songs', 'jaw',[62] 'Ares' and 'dwellings'.[63] Finally, in four passages from the fifth and fourth centuries (*c*), its applications have a full iconymic freedom. In the *Persians* Aeschylus uses the word of πόθος, in the *Agamemnon* of 'lions'; Philoxenus in a highly dithyrambic passage applies it to the hands of the diners at a feast, and Aristotle (*poeticus*) to great toils. In that last instance, and perhaps in the Aeschylean instances, one might infer some assimilation to μάλα, 'very'.

My interpretation of these three groupings would be that the word is stable in epic, but fossilized. As an obsolete word, it loses its determinate meaning, and, once taken out of its formulaic strait-jacket, it becomes an iconym. The fossilized epic use, nevertheless, survives sufficiently to permit allusion to it. None of this justifies the attribution of ordinary meanings ('fierce, raging, ...violent, terrible') by LSJ.

A comparable instance is the adjective ἀδινός (or ἁδινός).[64] LSJ s.v.:

[62] In this instance it might be argued that μαλερός is transferred (metonymically) from πυρός to γνάθος – engendering, in consequence, that intrusive effect associated with tenor adjectives attached to vehicle nouns: see Silk (n. 11 above), 142, 144. But μαλερός, as an iconym, is hardly capable of such a distinct effect.

[63] Strictly their 'roofs', a stock fifth-century poetic metonym. To suggest that μαλερά and μέλαθρα belong together should not have to be controversial, when position and parallel sound and rhythm, as well as the appearances of inflexion, force them together. In restrospect we might think the adjective has the feel of a transferred epithet or a kind of predicative force, but the notion (in LSJ, Lee ad loc., *et al.*) that μαλερά is adverbial is a rationalizer's response, not a reader's or listener's. The Euripidean phrase is bracketed (evidently as an intrusive gloss) in the new *OCT*, but the editor, Diggle, gives no sign of supposing that the words themselves are corrupt or untragic or indeed un-Euripidean.

[64] Aspiration (like etymology) uncertain. As LSJ observes, *s. fin.*, Aristarchus took the word to be ἀδ-, from which fact alone one could infer that the matter was in doubt. In my citations I have simply followed the different spellings in the editions used.

ἀδινός [ᾰ], ή, όν, radic. sense, *close, thick*: hence in Hom., **1.** *crowded, thronging*, ἀ. κῆρ, like πυκιναὶ φρένες, in physical sense, Il. 16. 481, Od. 19. 516; of bees, flies, sheep, Il. 2. 87, 469, Od. 1. 92. **2.** *vehement, loud*, of sounds, ἀ. γόος Il. 18. 316; Σειρῆνες ἀ. the *loud-voiced* Sirens, Od. 23. 326. Adv. -ῶς *frequently*, or *loudly, vehemently*, ἀ. ἀνενείκατο Il. 19. 314: neut. as Adv., ἀδινὸν γοόωσα Od. 4. 721; ἀ. μυκώμεναι 10. 413: pl., ἀδινὰ στεναχίζων Il. 23. 225; κλαῖ' ἀ. 24. 510: Comp. ἀδινώτερον Od. 16. 216: – rare in Lyr. and Trag., ἀ. δάκος a *deep* bite, Pi. *P.* 2. 53: ἀ. δάκρυα *thick-falling* tears, S. *Tr.* 848 (lyr.); βίοτος ἀ. *abundant*, Tim. *Pers.* 29; and freq. in A.R., ἀ. ὕπνος, κῶμα *abundant, deep* sleep, 3. 616, 748; ἀ. εὐνή *frequent* wedded joys, 3. 1206. (Aristarch. wrote ἁδ-, cf. ἁδρός.)

LSJ's article embodies the usual determined attempt to organize an iconym into real senses ('*close, thick...crowded, thronging...vehement, loud...*' etc.), even at the risk of evident nonsense ('*thronging*, ἀ. κῆρ') and evident helplessness in the face of the unclassifiability of the post-Homeric usages.

The full list of occurrences – again not all are in LSJ – falls into four sets. The first set consists of Homeric passages in which the word is used in contexts of weeping or grief, explicitly or implicitly *noisy* grief:

(a)   *Il.* 23. 225 ἀδινὰ στεναχίζων
     Od. 24. 317 ἀδινὰ στεναχίζων
     Il. 24. 123 ἀδινὰ στενάχοντα
     Od. 7. 274 ἀδινὰ στενάχοντα
     Il. 18. 124 ἀδινὸν στοναχῆσαι
     Il. 24. 510 κλαῖ' ἀδινά
     (cf. *Od.* 16. 216 in (c))
     Od. 4. 721 ἀδινὸν γοόωσα
     Il. 22. 430 ἀδινοῦ...γόοιο
          23. 17 ἀδινοῦ...γόοιο
          24. 747 ἀδινοῦ...γόοιο
     (so too *Il.* 18. 316 in (c))
     Il. 19. 312–14 πυκινῶς ἀκαχήμενον· οὐδέ τι θυμῷ | τέρπετο... | μνησάμενος
         δ' ἀδινῶς ἀνενείκατο.

The various applications, most of them quasi-adverbial, present a reasonable measure of stability, but the presumption that ἀδινός has no semantic weight suggests that its use in *Iliad* 19 with the obscure ἀνενείκατο[65] is somewhat speculative. The most clear-cut feature of this passage is the parallelism of ἀδινῶς with the non-iconymic πυκινῶς. πυκ(ι)νός, unlike ἀδινός, genuinely *means* 'close', and if elsewhere ἀδινός seems sometimes to be used as if it too did, assimilation to the similarly shaped πυκινός may be inferred.[66]

A second set consists of four Homeric passages in which ἀδινός is applied, consistently again, to animals:

(b)   *Il.* 2. 87 μελισσάων ἀδινάων
        2. 469 μυιάων ἀδινάων
     Od. 1. 92 μῆλ' ἀδινά
        4. 320 μῆλ' ἀδινά.

In a third Homeric set, the word is quite variously applied, but in contexts where *both* weeping or grief *and* animals are involved:

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  [65] cf. the discussion in Leaf ad loc.
  [66] It is noteworthy that epic uses phrases like πυκνά...στενάχων (*Il.* 18. 318, cf. 10. 9, 21. 417), and that the instance in *Iliad* 18 occurs in the vicinity of ἀδινός (see list (c)). The words occur again in close proximity at *Od.* 19. 516 (also listed under (c)).

(c) *Od.* 16. 216 κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως, ἀδινώτερον ἤ τ' οἰωνοί
     Od. 10. 410–15 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἄν...πόριες περὶ βοῦς...σκαίρουσιν...
                  ἀδινὸν μυκώμεναι...ὣς ἔμ' ἐκεῖνοι ἐπεὶ ἴδον...
                  δακρυόεντες ἔχυντο
     Il. 18. 316–18 ἀδινοῦ ἐξῆρχε γόοιο...πυκνὰ μάλα στενάχων ὥς τε λίς...
     Od. 19. 516–21 πυκιναὶ δέ μοι ἀμφ' ἀδινὸν κῆρ
                  ὀξεῖαι μελεδῶνες ὀδυρομένην ἐρέθουσιν,
                  ὡς δ' ὅτε...ἀηδών...χέει πολυηχέα φωνήν...

In *Odyssey* 16 the word is straightforwardly applied to κλαῖον and οἰωνοί as the
ground of a comparison.[67] In *Odyssey* 10 it qualifies the sounds of calves as they frisk
about their mothers, quite without any grief – but in a comparison with Odysseus'
men, weeping at the sight of him. In *Iliad* 18 the familiar application to γόος is followed
by the 'parallel' πυκ(ι)νός and at once by an animal simile; while in *Odyssey* 19
Penelope applies the word quite differently to her κῆρ, but again in the context of
πυκινός and again immediately before an animal simile. In these four passages, the
connotations of ἀδινός seem to radiate over the surrounding text. No sharp effect
results, but the deviation from the usual static quality of Homeric style is striking.

As with μαλερός, the final set shows a full iconymic diversity, though this time the
diffusion begins in Homer:

(d) *Il.* 16. 481 ἔβαλ' ἔνθ' ἄρα τε φρένες ἔρχαται ἀμφ' ἀδινὸν κῆρ
     (so too *Od.* 19. 516 in (c))
     Od. 23. 326 Σειρήνων ἀδινάων φθόγγον ἄκουσεν
     h. Cer. 67 f. τῆς ἀδινὴν ὄπ' ἄκουσα...ὥς τε βιαζομένης
     Ibyc. S. 167. 8 ἀδινοῖς βελέεσσι
     Emped. 110. 1 ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν
     Pi. *P.* 2. 53 φεύγειν δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριᾶν
     S. *Tr.* 846–8 ὀλοὰ στένει,...ἀδινῶν χλωρὰν τέγγει δακρύων ἄχναν
     Timoth. (*Pers.*) 15. 29 βίοτος ἐθύετ' ἀδινός.

The Odyssean application to κῆρ just discussed finds a parallel in *Iliad* 16 (but here
without attendant animals), to which a later employment by Empedocles apparently
harks back, albeit the philosopher's πραπίδες are more abstract and more intellectual
than Homer's κῆρ. In *Odyssey* 23 the word is applied to the Sirens, perhaps with
allusion intended to their song (though their vocal performance has little in common
with those of weepers), and in the *Hymn to Demeter* to Persephone's voice, evidently
as if it *denoted* the distress it *connotes* in set (a). The remaining applications are
unpredictable: in Ibycus the word goes with βέλεα; in Pindar with δάκος (cf. *animals*)[68]
κακαγοριᾶν; in Sophocles with δάκρυα, in the Homeric context of grief, though
un-Homerically with a fully physical noun; and in Timotheus with the βίοτος of the
combatants at Salamis. In this Timotheus passage we might detect faint echoes of the
distress of set (a) and, by virtue of the juxtaposition with θύεσθαι, the animal world
of set (b).[69]

XIII

One understands a phenomenon partly by understanding its limits. Accordingly,
having listed these examples of iconymy, I offer some instances which might be taken

[67] With ἀδινώτερον a weak neutral ground-term: Silk (n. 11 above), 19–21, 88.

[68] δάκος in classical Greek always denotes a wild or dangerous animal (cf. LSJ ι). The received
opinion that in Pi. *P.* 2 the word means 'bite' is arbitrary. It should be taken as 'monster', with
κακαγοριᾶν a defining genitive, like (e.g.) ἄχθος...γυναικῶν at S. *El.* 1241 f.

[69] A θῦμα need not be, but characteristically is, an animal victim: cf. LSJ s.v.

to be iconyms, but are either not or only doubtfully so. One type is represented by my earlier example, ἀγήνωρ: a stable archaism, subjected to idiolectal treatment by a single author.[70] Another type involves epic words whose use is stable, but whose meaning is obscure – like μαλερός as epithet of 'fire' or ἀδινός in the context of grief.[71] Unlike μαλερός and ἀδινός, however, many or most of these words never become iconymic: they remain fossils. A good example is μέροψ. LSJ s.v.:

> **μέροψ,** οπος, ὁ, poet. word, used only in pl. as epith. of men, derived by Gramm. from μείρομαι, ὄψ, *dividing the voice*, i.e. *articulate* (cf. Hsch., Sch. Il. 1. 250), μ. ἄνθρωποι Il. 1. l. c., Hes. *Op.* 109, etc.; μ. βροτοί Il. 2. 285; μερόπεσσι λαοῖς A. *Supp.* 90 (lyr.): hence as Subst., = ἄνθρωποι, Musae. *Fr.* 13 D., A. *Ch.* 1018 (anap.), E. *IT* 1263 (lyr.), A.R. 4. 536, Call. *Fr.* 418, *AP* 7. 563 (Paul. Sil.); a usage satirized by Strato Com., 1. 6 sq. **II.** in sg. and pl., *bee-eater, Merops apiaster*, Arist. *HA* 615ᵇ 25, Plu. 2. 976d; cf. εἶροψ.

As LSJ says, the poetic μέροψ occurs only in the plural 'as epithet of men' or as a plural noun – that is, as metonym for 'men'. Like πέμφιξ, the word coexists with an apparently separate 'ordinary' lexeme, the name of a bird. Many cult epithets have the same properties as μέροψ: they are obscure, but stable, therefore not iconymic: Λύκειος, Apollo's epithet, is a well-known example. With words like μέροψ or Λύκειος it is a presumption, and no more, that their fossilization implies (or comes to imply) semantic emptiness. With iconyms, even iconyms like μαλερός, such emptiness is one of the essential properties – and the fact that a word is iconymic by a given period may be used to prove that any stable, but relatable, use still remaining (as μαλερός of 'fire') *must* be semantically empty.

Any purely poetic word should be scrutinized to see whether it is, or eventually becomes, an iconym, but with some it is impossible to be sure. This is particularly the case with adjectives. Some adjectives do have diverse applications: how diverse do they have to be to rouse our suspicions? Take an example like ὄβριμος, on which LSJ offers the following:

> **ὄβρῐμος,** ον, also α, ον E. *Or.* 1454 (lyr.): – *strong, mighty*, epith. of Ares, Il. 5. 845, al.; of Achilles, 19. 408; of Hector, 8. 473; also of things, ὁ. ἔγχος 3. 357, etc.; ἄχθος Od. 9. 233; θυρεός, λίθος, ib. 241, 305; ὕδωρ Il. 4. 453; ἐβρόντησε ὄβριμον he thundered *mightily*, Hes. *Th.* 839; ὁ. ἔργα deeds *of might*, Tyrt. 11. 27. – Ep. word, rare in Trag., ἄνδρες ὁ. A. *Th.* 794; μῖσος ὁ. Id. *Ag.* 1411 (lyr.); Ἰδαία μᾶτερ ὁ. E. l. c. – The form ὄμβριμος is a freq. f. l., as in Il. 5. 845, al., Pi. *O.* 4. 8, *P.* 9. 27, A. *Th.* l. c. (Cf. βριμός· μέγας, χαλεπός, Hsch., to which ὄβριμος may be related as Ὀβριμώ[ι] Lyc. 698 to Βριμώ, Ὀβριαρεύς to Βριαρεύς, *EM* 346. 41, and Ὀβριάρεως to Βριάρεως; cf. also βρίμη, βριμάομαι, βριαρός.)

Within epic alone, the word is applied to the God Ares, to heroes, to a spear, to the Cyclops' load of wood, to his door-stone, to water, to the thundering of Zeus. The approved sense 'mighty' fits all the passages more or less.[72] In such a case one assumes that the word was what most words are, and not an iconym. One could be wrong.

In some cases a word that looks to be an iconym *prima facie* is, on reflection, not to be taken that way. Consider πίτυλος:

> **πῐτῡλ-εύω,** (πίτυλος) *ply the sweeping oar*, Ar. *V.* 678. **2.** = sq. 1, *Com. Adesp.* 3 D. **-ίζω,** *practise regular swinging of the arms*, as with dumb-bells, Gal. 6. 133, 144. **2.** *dart about*, ἰχθύων γένεσιν ἐν κολύμβοις – ίζουσαν Anon. ap. Suid. **-ος,** ὁ, *sweep* of oars, νεὼς π. εὐήρης, periphr. for *a ship and its oars*, E. *IT* 1050, cf. 1346, *Tr.* 1123:

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[70] Above, p. 314.

[71] In such cases the distinction between 'meaning' and 'use' is indispensable and the folly of attempting a theoretical equation of the two terms (see n. 26 above) most apparent.

[72] The word is usefully discussed by Sideras (n. 39 above), 66 f.

pl., Hp. ap. Gal. 19. 131; ναῦς ὅταν ἐκ πιτύλων ῥοθιάζῃ Ar. *Fr.* 84: metaph., ἐνὶ π.
with one sweep, all together, A. *Pers.* 976 (lyr.).   **2.** *shower, torrent*, δακρύων E. *Hipp.*
1464 (anap.); of blows, Theoc. 22. 127, cf. Poll. 2. 147; ἄρασσε κρᾶτα πιτύλους
διδοῦσα χειρός E. *Tr.* 1236 (lyr.).   **3.** *onslaught*, π. Ἀργείου δορός Id. *Heracl.* 834,
cf. *Fr.* 495. 11; δὶς δὲ δυοῖν πιτύλοιν τείχη .. κατέλυσεν αἰχμά Id. *Tr.* 817 (lyr.); with
allusion to signf. 1, ἐρέσσετ' ἀμφὶ κρατὶ πόμπιμον χεροῖν π. A. *Th.* 856 (lyr.).   **b.**
attack, fit, μανίας E. *IT* 307; ἆρ' ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν π. ἥκομεν φόβου; *are we victims of
the same attack of fear*, i.e. *are we seeing the same phantasms?* Id. *HF* 816; μαινομένῳ
π. πλαγχθείς ib. 1189 (lyr.); π. σκύφου the mad *fit* of the wine-cup, Id. *Alc.* 798: as
Adj., *mad*, Phld. *Rh.* 1. 251 S. (s. v. l.).

From the diversity of senses ascribed to the word by LSJ, one would certainly become
suspicious: 'sweep of oars', 'shower', 'onslaught', 'attack, fit'. However, there is
('trustworthy') prose usage in favour of the first of these senses, in a Hippocratic
fragment cited by Galen; that usage is in line with the predominant verse use (found
in Aristophanes and Euripides and alluded to by Aeschylus);[73] and the deviant verse
uses are almost all from one pen – that of Euripides. This is perhaps an archaism (there
are a few other probable archaisms found in the Hippocratic corpus),[74] but, if so,
a stable archaism like ἀγήνωρ that is variously – i.e. metaphorically – reapplied by
one poet.[75]

The elevated adjective ἁρπαλέος is another relatively straightforward word which
might be mistaken for an iconym, and here a tradition of misinterpretation, represented
by LSJ among other authorities, is certainly to blame. LSJ s.v.:

ἁρπᾰλ-έος, α, ον, Ep. Adj., (ἁρπάζω): *devouring, consuming*, νοῦσος *IPE* 2. 167. 3
(Panticapaeum); *greedy*, παλάμη *AP* 9. 576 (Nicarch.); ἁ. καὶ οἷον δὴ οὖν ἀεὶ τῶν
ὀθνείων ἐφίεσθαι Agath. 4. 13; elsewh. only in Adv., *greedily, eagerly*, ἢ τοι ὁ πῖνε
καὶ ἦσθε..ἁρπαλέως Od. 6. 250, cf. 14. 110; δέξεται ἁρπαλέως Thgn. 1046; ἁ. εὔδειν
gladly, pleasantly, Mimn. 12. 8; ἁ. ἐπεχήρατο *vehemently*, A.R. 4. 56; once in Ar.,
ἁ. ἀραμένη *Lys.* 331 (lyr.).   **II.** *attractive, alluring, charming*, κέρδεα Od. 8. 164; ἁ.
ἔρως, opp. ἀπηνής, Thgn. 1353; ἄνθεα ἥβης ἁρπαλέα Mimn. 1. 4; δόσιν *gift to be
eagerly seized*, Pi. *P.* 8. 65, cf. 10. 62.   -**ίζω**, *catch up, be eager to receive*, τινὰ
κωκυτοῖς A. *Th.* 243: – also in Med., Hsch.   **2.** *exact greedily*, A. *Eu.* 983 (lyr.).
3. ἁ. τὰ μετέωρά σου *settle* your outstanding transactions, *P Lond. ined.* 1561.   -**ιμος**,
η, ον, = ἁρπακτός, προσφιλής, Hsch.

The truth is that in all its classical occurrences ἁρπαλέος means 'pleasing' and
ἁρπαλέως 'gladly' (i.e. the subject of the verb is 'pleased to...'): the relationship of
adjective to adverb, then, corresponds to that of ἡδύς to ἡδέως in more ordinary
Greek.[76] The evidence is as follows:

(a)   *Od.* 8. 163 f. ἐπίσκοπος...ὁδαίων | κερδέων θ' ἁρπαλέων
      Mimn. 1. 3 f. κρυπταδίη φιλότης καὶ μείλιχα δῶρα καὶ εὐνή
                   οἵ' ἥβης ἄνθεα γίνεται ἁρπαλέα
      Thgn. 301, 1353 πικρὸς καὶ γλυκύς...καὶ ἁρπαλέος καὶ ἀπηνής
      Thgn. 1208 ἁρπαλέος παρέων καὶ φίλος εὖτ' ἂν ἀπῇς
      Pi. *P.* 8. 65 f. ἁρπαλέαν δόσιν...ἐπάγαγες

[73] In *Th.* 856 (cf. LSJ s.v. 3a), whereas LSJ's classification of *Pers.* 976 under the 'oar' sense
(1) is somewhat arbitrary.
[74] Mostly involving words attested in Homer, but (outside Hp.) not in pre-Hellenistic prose.
A typical example is ἀλθαίνειν: see LSJ s.v. and N. van Brock, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire
médical du grec ancien* (1961), 198 ff. Cf. also Leumann (n. 13 above), 308 ff.
[75] For a fuller discussion of the applications of the word, see Barratt on E. *Hipp.* 1464.
[76] So, rightly, *Lex. fr.–gr. Ep.* although the article is spoiled by an arbitrary ascription of the
sense 'heftig' to Aristophanes' ἁρπαλέως (cf. LSJ's 'vehemently'). R. Renehan, *Greek
Lexicographical Notes* (1975), 41, offers some criticisms of LSJ's article, but appears to accept
its interpretations.

Pi. *P.* 10. 61 f. τῶν δ' ἕκαστος ὀρούει...ἁρπαλέαν σχέθοι
  φροντίδα τὰν πὰρ ποδός
[Tyrt. 11. 17 ἀργαλέον γὰρ ὄπισθε μετάφρενόν ἐστι δαΐζειν
  ἀνδρὸς φεύγοντος: ἁρπ. Ahrens]
(b) *Od.* 6. 249 f., 14. 109 f. ὁ πῖνε...ἁρπαλέως
  Mimn. 12. 8 εὗδονθ' ἁρπαλέως
  Thgn. 1046 ἡμέτερον κῶμον δέξεται ἁρπαλέως
  B. 13. 131 ἁρπαλέως ἄελπτον ἐξίκοντο χέρσον
  Ar. *Lys.* 328 ff. ἁρπαλέως | ἀραμένη ταῖσιν ἐμαῖς | δημότισιν
  καομέναις | φέρουσ' ὕδωρ βοηθῶ.

In group (*a*), the sense of ἁρπαλέος is clear and consistent. Gain is *pleasing* to Homer's merchant sailor, youth to Mimnermus. In the Theognis passages the word is opposed to ἀπηνής, 'cruel', and used in close relation to φίλος. Pindar speaks of the 'pleasing gift' of victory, and tells us that whatever a man aspires to, he should make near and *dear* to him. In group (*b*), in the same way, Odysseus is *glad* to take sustenance from Nausicaa, then from Eumaeus; Mimnermus' sun to sleep; the friend to welcome Theognis' troop of revellers; Bacchylides' sea-farers to find dry land; and Aristophanes' chorus of women to bring water up to their comrades-at-arms on the Acropolis.

If we now look back to LSJ's article, we find signs of confusion under 'II attractive...' and total disarray under I. In the first place the etymology of the word is uncertain. The connection with ἁρπάζειν, assumed by LSJ and older studies, is most likely to be folk-etymological and late.[77] We may agree that ἁρπ- is *alluded* to in a few of the passages – notably Mimn. 1. 3 f. and Pi. *P.* 10. 61f. – but only as an extra connotation: the sensuous impression of a 'grasping' of the ἄνθεα and the φροντίδα is subsidiary to the straightforward denotation expounded above. It follows that LSJ is quite wrong to offer 'devouring, consuming, greedy' as the word's first sense. As far as pre-Hellenistic Greek is concerned, the sense – as a real sense – simply does not exist. Regrettably, moreover, LSJ succeeds in giving the impression that ἁρπαλέος is a mystery word like αἰανής, pulled – or lost – between divergent interpretations. But ἁρπαλέος, though perhaps a γλῶττα, is stable and no iconym.

There is one other set of examples which at first sight resemble iconyms, and here, for once, I have found exact equivalents in a modern literary language. In two periods of English literature, the age of Spenser and the mock-Gothic era of Chatterton and Sir Walter Scott, the re-use of archaisms has been extensively practised. Some of the words re-used (largely medieval words) are visibly misunderstood, but in no case does misunderstanding seem to engender iconymic diffusion.[78] Rather, we find words with older meanings misunderstood in a *consistent* way: the old sense is superseded, the meaning simply changes. A typical instance is the word 'chevisance'. In Middle English this meant 'supply', 'provision', 'loan'.[79] Richard I, says a fifteenth-century author, 'purposed to go to the Holy Land and must make chevisance for much money'.[80] To writers like Spenser, however, the word irresistibly suggested *chevalier* and *chivalry*. Hence, in the *Faery Queen* (III. xi. 24), 'shameful thing / It were to

[77] Frisk and Chantraine (etymological dictionaries s.v.) interpret ἁρπαλ- as a folk-etymologized version of an earlier ἀλπαλ- (preserved in Hsch.), related to ἔλπομαι < *wel-p- > Lat. *volup.* This etymology is both plausible and compatible with my thesis, but not a prerequisite of it.

[78] Presumably because the superior methods of communication of those ages, however unsophisticated by our standards, would have tended to standardize current usage. For a list of such words in Spenser, see B. R. McElderry Jr., *PMLA* 47 (1932), 144 ff.

[79] And was still so understood by some writers as late as the seventeenth century: see the citations in *OED* s.v.

[80] Capgrave: *OED* s.v. II. 7. a.

abandon noble chevisance'. And hence, in early Victorian England, 'stand forth...bold child of Christian chevisance'.[81] There are certainly parallels in the Greek poetic vocabulary: thus πρόμος, in Homer equivalent to πρόμαχος, comes to mean ἀρχός.[82] One phase of stability is overtaken by another. No iconymy results.

XIV

What are the uses of iconyms for their poet-users? Like any γλῶτται they have a general *emblematic* function: an archaism is a decoration which shows the world that its wearer is an accredited member of a respected group – in this case, a group of poets with unusual knowledge of things past, and worthy of the special respect due to those in touch with the past. There are also more specific, creative uses, especially in Pindar. An iconym may not have a meaning, but it does have evocable connotations, and the characteristic pattern of the creative uses is to evoke more than one of these. I have already discussed Pindar's λείριος, where some such evocation is apparent, and Timotheus' ἀδινός, where two connotations are alluded to in a very muted way.[83] A more impressive and decisive instance involves another adjective, ἀμαιμάκετος. LSJ s.v.:

> **ἀμαιμάκετος**, η, ον, also ος, ον Hes. *Sc.* 207: – irresistible, old Ep. word, also in Lyr. and Trag. (lyr.); of Chimaera, Il. 6. 179, 16. 329; of fire vomited by her, Hes. *Th.* 319; of fire generally, S. *OT* 177; θάλασσα, πόντος, Hes. *Sc.* 207, Pi. *P.* 1. 14; of ship's mast, proof against any strain, Od. 14. 311; of the trident, Pi. *I.* 8(7). 37; ἀ. μένος, κινηθμός, *P.* 3. 33, 4. 208; νεῖκος *stubborn*, B. 10. 64; of the Furies, S. *OC* 127; ἀ. βυθοῖς in *unfathomable* depths, *IG* 3. 900. [Usu. derived fr. ἀ- intens., μαιμάω, i.e. *furious*; but apptly. connected with ἄμαχος by Poets.]

As elsewhere, LSJ offers fairly adequate evidence, but a highly unsatisfactory treatment, whereby an improbable series of ill-attested meanings alternates with unexceptionable descriptions of contexts: '*irresistible*'...of Chimaera...of fire... θάλασσα, πόντος...of ship's mast, proof against any strain...of the trident... μένος, κινηθμός...νεῖκος *stubborn*...of the Furies...'.

There are (at most) fourteen attested pre-Hellenistic occurrences of the word, which fall into four groups:

(a) Hes. *Th.* 319 Χίμαιραν...πνέουσαν ἀμαιμάκετον πῦρ
    Il. 6. 179 Χίμαιραν ἀμαιμακέτην
      16. 328 f. Χίμαιραν | θρέψεν ἀμαιμακέτην
    S. *OT* 177 ἀμαιμακέτου πυρός
    [*Batr.* 287 κεραυνόν, ἀμαιμάκετον Διὸς ὅπλον conj. Stadtmueller]

(b) *Od.* 14. 311 ἱστὸν ἀμαιμάκετον νηός
    Hes. *Sc.* 207 ἀμαιμακέτοιο θαλάσσης
    Mel. Adesp. S. 414 (a). 4 f. ἀμαιμακέταν πόντοιο...ριπάν
    Pi. *I.* 8. 35 τριόδοντός τ' ἀμαιμακέτου

(c) B. 11. 64 f. νεῖκος...ἀμαιμάκετον...ἀνέπαλτο
    Pi. *P.* 3. 32 f. πέμψεν κασιγνήταν μένει | θυίοισαν ἀμαιμακέτῳ
    S. *OC* 127 ἄλσος ἐς τάνδ' ἀμαιμακετᾶν κορᾶν

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[81] From Lytton's *King Arthur* (1849): *OED* s.v. (*s. fin.*).

[82] See LSJ s.v. πρόμος and Sideras (n. 39 above), 38.

[83] Above, pp. 320 and 324. It is hardly accidental that Pindar should be especially active in these linguistic manoeuvres. Not only is he the most sophisticated manipulator of words among the poets: he is also particularly fond of words of 'elastic meaning', as W. B. Stanford puts it (*Ambiguity in Greek Literature* [1939], 132).

(d) Pi. P. 1. 13–16 ὅσσα δὲ μὴ πεφίληκε Ζεύς, ἀτύζονται βοάν
            Πιερίδων ἀΐοντα, γᾶν τε καὶ πόντον κατ' ἀμαιμάκετον,
            ὅς τ' ἐν αἰνᾷ Ταρτάρῳ κεῖται, θεῶν πολέμιος,
            Τυφὼς ἑκατοντακάρανος
    Pi. P. 4. 208 f. συνδρόμων κινηθμὸν ἀμαιμάκετον
            ἐκφυγεῖν πετρᾶν.

In the first group, the word is used in the context of Chimaera and/or fire: in Hesiod, in the *Iliad*, in tragedy, and (perhaps) in epic parody. In the second group, the word occurs in maritime contexts, albeit with no consistent application, so that we find it applied to a mast in the *Odyssey*, to the sea itself in the *Scutum*, to a trident in Pindar,[84] and (apparently) to the ῥιπή of the sea in an anonymous lyric fragment.[85] The third group contains three otherwise unclassifiable passages in which nothing is clear but the iconymic status of the epithet. Bacchylides applies the word to νεῖκος, Pindar to the μένος of Artemis punishing Coronis, Sophocles to the Eumenides. The explanation of the Sophoclean use is perhaps that the word's early association with the Chimaera had given it a connotation of *monstrosity*. In the Pindar and the Bacchylides one might detect the allusion to ἄμαχος of which LSJ speaks: there is not much sign of the association elsewhere.

    In the fourth group are two Pindaric passages in which the word is more suggestively deployed. In *Pythian* 1 Pindar speaks of the enemies of Zeus who take flight at the sound of the Pierides by land or by sea – πόντον κατ' ἀμαιμάκετον – and particularly that enemy of the gods, Typho with his hundred heads, who now lies beneath Mount Etna. The iconym ἀμαιμάκετος is used immediately in its maritime context, but in its misty and faintly mysterious way also serves to evoke from (c) the sense of monstrousness and from (a) the notion of fire which are at once made manifest in the intense depiction of Typho under Etna. The passage from *Pythian* 4 evokes the same connotations without the fire. The Argonauts pray to Poseidon to escape the clashing rocks, whose motion is called ἀμαιμάκετος. The context, once again, is sea and ships, while the κινηθμός, once again, is invested with a fitting aura of the monstrous. No less appropriate here is the sense of imprecision that derives directly from the adjective's iconymic basis: the menace is diffuse, elusive, resistant to ordinary logic.

    In both of these passages the evocations carried by the iconym float over the whole context. One might say that an iconym is peculiarly suited to produce such an effect because it is nothing more than floating evocations itself.

XV

Much of my argument has concerned the *effect* of iconymic usage. With an iconym it is barely possible to separate the question of 'meaning' from the effect. It is not, one might object, the function of a Greek lexicon to construct or reconstruct effects. Nor is it – with ordinary words used ordinarily. On the other hand, the distinction between metaphor and 'dead metaphor' is a matter of effect, but also of meaning – and that distinction is one that a lexicon should take account of. So too, I suggest, is the distinction between a word with ordinary meaning (even an 'ordinary' archaism) and an iconym. And if the lexicographer is to take account of iconymy, he must know not only what it is and how to recognize it, but how to present it.

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    [84] With an additional, but very faint, allusion to fire, by virtue of a reference to κεραυνός, parallel to τριόδους, in the previous line.
    [85] Where, however, the gap between πόντοιο and ῥιπάν is a papyrus gap, in view of which it is not certain that ῥιπάν and ἀμαιμακέταν belong together.

If my argument has been sound, it follows that what I call iconyms are resistant to normal lexicographical procedures – the procedures followed without explanation or (generally) hesitation by LSJ. Irrespective of how other words would best be treated, I would wish to see LSJ labelling iconyms as such, with the instances arranged into groups defined by contexts or associations, not by meanings, and presented for the most part without reference to meanings, and with sufficient discussion of when the word seems to have attained its iconymic status. I look forward to the tenth edition.[86]

King's College, London   M. S. SILK

[86] The immediate prospects for a tenth edition of LSJ may not be good, but one can hope. The most recent endeavour in the Greek lexicographical field, the *Diccionario Griego–Español*, does not seem appreciably more sophisticated than LSJ[9] in literary-lexicographical terms, to judge from its first volume (α – ἀλλά, 1980).